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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Further delays in pursuing the clearly viable option of embryonic 
stem cells will result in an irretrievable loss of time, especially if the 
new approach fails to prove itself.”1  This was the appeal of James 
Thomson shortly after his team of scientists at the University of Wis-
consin and another led by Shinya Yamanaka at Kyoto University sepa-
rately reported in November 2007 that they had reprogrammed adult 
skin cells to behave like human embryonic stem cells.2  What makes 
this recent discovery so exciting is that it obviates the need to destroy 
human embryos—a point of heated public controversy3—in the proc-
ess of deriving pluripotent stem cells:  cells that have the ability to de-
velop into any human tissue type and thus possess great potential for 
 
 ∗ Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, May 2009.  Many thanks 
are due to Professors Seth Kreimer and Kermit Roosevelt for their comments on previous 
drafts.  I would also like to thank the editors of the Journal of Constitutional Law for their 
thoughtful editing. 
 1 Alan I. Leshner & James A. Thomson, Standing in the Way of Stem Cell Research, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 3, 2007, at A17 (criticizing public policy on embryonic stem cell research). 
 2 Gina Kolata, Scientists Bypass Need for Embryo to Get Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at 
1.  For the published report of Dr. Thomson’s team, see Junying Yu et al., Induced Pluripo-
tent Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Somatic Cells, 318 SCIENCE 1917 (2007).  For the 
published report of Dr. Yamanaka’s team, see Kazutoshi Takahashi et al., Induction of Plu-
ripotent Stem Cells from Adult Human Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861 (2007). 
 3 See CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 195–216 (2005) (describing the 
controversy between liberals who support embryonic stem cell research for its rich thera-
peutic potential and conservatives who are morally opposed to the destruction of em-
bryos, despite this potential).  Although their claims ultimately proved premature, com-
mentators rushed to declare the embryonic stem cell debate over upon the discovery of 
how to reprogram adult skin cells.  See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Stem Cell Vindication, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2007, at A23 (giving credit to President Bush’s restrictive federal 
policy for the discovery of reprogrammed cells); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Advance on Stem Cells 
Equalizes Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at A23 (explaining that the discovery of repro-
grammed cells is likely to transform the debate). 
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use in regenerative medicine and therapeutic research in general.4  
Yet, despite this breakthrough, leading experts agree that it is im-
perative for embryonic stem cell research to continue5 as major re-
search centers have pledged.6 
Indeed, it is much too early to tell whether reprogrammed cells 
promise the same therapeutic benefits that scientists believe natural 
embryonic stem cells do.  Interest in embryonic stem cell research 
 
 4 See Junying Yu & James A. Thomson, Embryonic Stem Cells, in NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 2006, at 1–8 (2006) [hereinafter REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 2006].  
Stem cells are classified as either embryonic or adult stem cells, depending on the type of 
tissue from which they are derived.  Thomas P. Zwaka, Use of Genetically Modified Stems Cells 
in Experimental Gene Therapies, in REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 2006, supra, at 46.  Embryonic 
stem cells may be derived from human embryos produced by in vitro fertilization, a proc-
ess in which oocytes are artificially fertilized with sperm in a culture dish, or by somatic 
cell nuclear transfer, a technique that involves the cloning of a human embryo.  Yu & 
Thomson, supra, at 3.  Their therapeutic potential is far superior to that of adult stem 
cells because they are undifferentiated and pluripotent, meaning that they have not yet 
developed into the specialized cells found in an adult human.  Id. at 1–3, 6.  If cultured 
and maintained under appropriate conditions, embryonic stem cells can replicate them-
selves indefinitely while still possessing the capacity to develop into any cell type in the 
adult human body.  Id. at 3.  Adult stem cells, on the other hand, are differentiated and 
multipotent, meaning that they are specialized and can only develop into a select number 
of cell types.  Zwaka, supra, at 46.  Therefore, when transplanted to an adult human, adult 
stem cells only sustain the cell types already present in steady-state numbers over the 
course of the individual’s lifetime because they rarely divide, rather than regenerating 
new cells at the rate embryonic stem cells do.  See id.  However, therapies derived from 
adult hematopoietic stem cells, which themselves are derived from bone marrow, have 
been thoroughly studied and are widely used, particularly to treat forms of bone marrow 
cancer such as leukemia.  Jos Domen et al., Bone Marrow (Hematopoietic) Stem Cells, in 
REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 2006, supra, at 24, 28. 
 5 See Alice Park et al., The Year in Medicine from A to Z, TIME, Dec. 3, 2007, at 65 (reporting 
Dr. Yamanaka’s statement:  “My hope is to avoid using human embryonic stem 
cells . . . [b]ut at this point, I am not 100% sure that is possible yet”); Peter N. Spotts, 
Stem-Cell Advance Opens Up the Field, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 23, 2007, at 1 (report-
ing Dr. Thomson’s belief that “embryonic stem-cell research is still vital”); Interview by 
Natasha Pinol, Commc’ns Officer for Science, with Dr. James Thomson & Dr. Junying Yu, 
in Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci., at 21:29–21:53 (Nov. 20, 2007), available at 
www.aaas.org/news/releases/2007/media/200711transcript_yu_thomson.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Thomson & Yu Interview] (reporting Dr. Yu’s statement:  “Personally I don’t think it is 
a good idea to abandon research on the human embryonic stem cells.  This new research 
is just the beginning.  We had to understand how these cells work and how similar these 
cells are to embryonic stem cells.  So I would think most of the people still want to do re-
search on the human embryonic stem cells”); see also ABP, Stem Cell Advance May Not End 
Debate, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Dec. 25, 2007, at 14 (discussing the lack of certainty as to the 
promise of reprogrammed cells). 
 6 See Colin Nickerson, Caution Urged in New Method for Stem Cells:  Harvard Sticks to Cloning, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2007, at 1A.  However, some researchers have decided to forego 
embryonic stem cell research in favor of reprogramming because the latter is more cost-
effective and easier to perform.  See Gautam Naik, Advance in Stem-Cell Work Avoids Destroy-
ing Embryos, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2007, at A1. 
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derives from the belief that it will lead to the development of trans-
plantation therapies to treat individuals with degenerative conditions, 
such as Parkinson’s disease, leukemia, diabetes, heart disease, and 
spinal cord injury, caused by the destruction or dysfunction of par-
ticular cell types.7  Short of transplantation therapies, embryonic stem 
cells may support basic medical research by allowing scientists to 
study biological developmental processes, especially in early devel-
opment, and to better understand certain diseases, conditions, and 
birth defects.8  Due to the unlimited supply of human tissue that em-
bryonic stem cells could provide, scientists could perform tests on 
certain organs, such as human hearts, which are currently unavailable 
for testing,9 and develop new and more effective drugs.10  Although 
embryonic stem cells and reprogrammed cells appear identical under 
the microscope, the latter are artificial and could very well turn out 
not to possess the same characteristics as embryonic stem cells.11  
Even to understand reprogrammed cells more fully, scientists will 
have to continue studying embryonic stem cells.12  To be sure, the 
study of embryonic stem cells was essential to the discovery of how to 
reprogram adult cells in the first place.13 
Government policy on embryonic stem cell research has already 
set this young and promising field back approximately five years.14  
While various States and private institutions independently began 
funding embryonic stem cell research15 as a result of federal funding 
restrictions that President Obama only recently lifted on March 9, 
2009,16 other States have taken a more hostile approach, adopting sta-
tutes that prohibit or otherwise incidentally burden the performance 
of this research within state lines.  The most restrictive of these stat-
utes specifically ban in vitro fertilization or somatic cell nuclear trans-
 
 7 See Yu & Thomson, supra note 4, at 1–8. 
 8 Id. at 4, 7. 
 9 Since no human heart cell lines exist, scientists typically perform tests on animal models.  
Id. at 4. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See Leshner & Thomson, supra note 1, at A17; Nickerson, supra note 6, at 1A. 
 12 See Thomson & Yu Interview, supra note 5, at 21:54–22:11, 27:34–28:10 (reporting Dr. 
Thomson’s suggestion that scientists will not abandon embryonic stem cell research be-
cause they “need a gold standard” with which to compare reprogrammed cells). 
 13 See id. at 21:29–21:53. 
 14 See Thomson & Yu Interview, supra note 5, at 34:01–34:49. 
 15 See STEM CELL RESEARCH, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2008), 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/embfet.htm. 
 16 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Lifts Bush’s Strict Limits on Stem Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
9, 2009. 
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fer for research purposes—the two techniques used by scientists to 
create natural human embryos.17 
It goes without saying that time is precious in this matter.  The 
slower the pace of research, the longer it will take to develop safe and 
effective therapies derived from embryonic stem cells to treat the sick 
and prevent unnecessary suffering and death.18  Repealing legislative 
restrictions on embryonic stem cell research is one possible means of 
aiding its stilted progress, but litigation may be a faster, more effec-
tive avenue than the political process.  The only way to remove the 
matter completely from the political process is to challenge these laws 
on constitutional grounds. 
Successful constitutional challenges to laws restricting embryonic 
stem cell research would likely provide benefits that increased fund-
ing alone could not deliver.  Indeed, some of the States with restric-
tive laws on their books have important scientific research centers 
that could develop flourishing programs in embryonic stem cell re-
search if freed from governmental interference.19  Additionally, fund-
ing of research in any State has its limits, and it is possible that more 
facilities distributed throughout the country could reap greater cu-
mulative funding than could fewer facilities in only a handful of 
States.20  Local donors, for instance, may be inclined to donate to a 
local program rather than to a program in a State far away.21  Fur-
thermore, scientists who wish to engage in embryonic stem cell re-
search will have less incentive to emigrate from a State if they can 
practice their profession close to home, which could promote interest 
in the field amongst individuals with no previous access.22  All this 
could lead to an overall increase of activity in embryonic stem cell re-
search throughout the country.23 
There has not yet been, as of the writing of this Comment, a con-
stitutional challenge to a law restricting embryonic stem cell research.  
However, the recent “flurry and scope of legal activity amassing 
 
 17 See STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 15. 
 18 See Leshner & Thomson, supra note 1, at A17. 
 19 See John A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the “Culture of Life”:  Constitutional Issues in the 
Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 32 n.132. 
 20 See National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
health/genetics/embfet.htm. 
 21 See id. 
 22 Leshner & Thomson, supra note 1, at A17. 
 23 See Robertson, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that “[w]hile every bit of research funding 
helps, in the long run state efforts are not likely to replace the steam lost by denying NIH 
a major role in ESC science”). 
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around stem cell research . . . . warns that law is fast becoming the 
next battleground” in the debate.24 
This Comment argues that current substantive due process doc-
trine provides substantial support for the proposition that laws re-
stricting embryonic stem cell research violate an individual’s right to 
therapeutic medical treatment, which protects against state interfer-
ence with the development of prospective therapies derived from 
embryonic stem cells.25  Part II.A demonstrates that, as a matter of le-
gal tradition, the law has historically protected an individual’s right to 
therapeutic medical treatment and accommodated the performance 
of therapeutic research with little, if any, restriction until well into the 
latter half of the twentieth century.  Therefore, history and tradition, 
at a minimum, should not foreclose the prospect of substantive due 
process protection for embryonic stem cell research.  Part II.B dem-
onstrates that courts have provided substantive due process protec-
 
 24 Judith F. Daar, Decoding the Stem Cell Debate:  A Primer Par Excellence, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
184, 188 (2008) (reviewing RUSSELL KOROBKIN & STEPHEN R. MUNZER, STEM CELL 
CENTURY:  LAW AND POLICY FOR A BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGY (2007)) (citing Abigail Al-
liance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 703 (2007), 
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008), which held that terminally ill patients do not have a 
substantive due process right to access investigational drugs); see also Doe v. Klein, 254 F. 
App’x 626, 629 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissing for lack of venue an action to enjoin Califor-
nia officials administering the State’s embryonic stem cell research institute from engag-
ing in such research on the ground that it deprives embryos of a right to life without due 
process); Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421, 1428–29 (D. Md. 1994) (dismissing for lack of 
standing an action to enjoin an advisory panel from submitting a report supporting fetal 
tissue research to the Department of Health and Human Services on the ground that 
such research deprives embryos of a right to life without due process). 
 25 Alternative substantive due process theories for challenging laws restricting patients’ ac-
cess to medical treatment and therapeutic research have been made in the past.  See 
RUSSELL KOROBKIN & STEPHEN R. MUNZER, STEM CELL CENTURY:  LAW AND POLICY FOR A 
BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGY 79–85 (2007) (suggesting that restrictions on embryonic 
stem cell research should be subject to strict scrutiny); Steven Goldberg, Cloning Matters:  
How Lawrence v. Texas Protects Therapeutic Research, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
305, 316–17 (2004) (arguing that restrictions on therapeutic cloning are based on repug-
nance alone and thus fail rational basis review); B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to 
Make Medical Treatment Decisions:  A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 341–42 
(2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence supports a right to make medi-
cal treatment choices, which could provide a possible basis for analyzing hypothetical laws 
restricting therapies derived from embryonic stem cell research); Robertson, supra note 
19, at 7–16 (arguing that patients have a negative right to safe and effective therapies de-
rived from embryonic-stem-cell-derived therapies); see also Kristin M. Hicks, Note, Embry-
onic Stem Cell Research and the Theory of Medical Self-Defense, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 547, 566 
(2008) (arguing that the medical self-defense principle, articulated in Eugene Volokh, 
Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1813 (2007), does not justify constitutional protection for embryonic stem cell re-
search). 
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tion against state interference with research related to the develop-
ment of prospective therapeutic medical treatments necessary to pre-
serve individuals’ life or health, and that such protection should logi-
cally extend to embryonic stem cell research.  Part III evaluates the 
constitutionality of laws restricting embryonic stem cell research 
within two frameworks—the undue burden standard and exacting 
scrutiny—either of which may legitimately apply under current doc-
trine.  Part IV concludes by suggesting that despite a substantial basis 
for challenging laws restricting embryonic stem cell research on sub-
stantive due process grounds, certain doctrinal and ideological limita-
tions should be seriously considered before bringing such an action. 
II.  THE PROSPECT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS PROTECTION 
AGAINST STATE INTERFERENCE WITH EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 
The threshold doctrinal question in a substantive due process 
challenge to laws restricting embryonic stem cell research is whether 
an individual’s right to therapeutic medical treatment, which prohib-
its state interference with the development of prospective therapies 
derived from such research, is a “fundamental liberty”26 protected by 
 
 26 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).  The Supreme Court has established 
that the “controlling word” in the Due Process Clause, at least with respect to its substan-
tive component, is “liberty,” not “life.”  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 846 (1992); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES § 7.3.4, at 579 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining that “claims concerning state depriva-
tions of life are litigated under constitutional provisions other than due process,” particu-
larly the Eighth Amendment, “and if they do involve due process, they concern the re-
quirements of due process in capital cases rather than the definition of life”).  However, it 
is arguable that the word “life” also has a substantive component.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973) (“If [a fetus is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] . . . the appellant’s case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’s right to life 
would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.”); James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel 
Avila, The Due Process “Right to Life” in Cruzan and Its Impact on “Right-to-Die” Law, 53 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 193, 193–94 (1992) (characterizing the right at stake in Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), as one of “life” rather than “liberty”); 
Sheldon Gelman, “Life” and “Liberty”:  Their Original Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and 
Current Significance in the Debate Over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 585, 690 (1994) (ar-
guing that, as originally understood, “‘life’ provides the textual basis for abortion rights in 
the Constitution”); Douglas O. Linder, The Other Right-to-Life Debate:  When Does Fourteenth 
Amendment “Life” End?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1183, 1206–07 (1995) (arguing that “the plain 
meaning” of the Due Process Clause protects against state interference with the provision 
of medical care because it “prohibits states from depriving ‘persons’ of their ‘lives’”).  To 
be sure, according to John Robertson, “a right to medical treatment is anchored by text” 
because the Due Process Clause “explicitly protects ‘life’ and ‘liberty.’”  Robertson, supra 
note 19, at 9.  Nevertheless, this Comment relies on the Supreme Court’s pronounce-
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the Due Process Clause.27  Indeed, only if this right is deemed funda-
mental can there be an argument that laws restricting embryonic 
stem cell research are subject to heightened scrutiny.28 
To be clear, the asserted right under consideration here is a nega-
tive right, in the sense that it does not mandate the affirmative provi-
sion of medical treatment by the government, but rather “affords 
protection against unwarranted government interference”29 with an 
individual’s access to therapeutic medical treatments derived from 
embryonic stem cell research.30  This right belongs to individuals 
seeking therapeutic medical treatment, and is distinct from a scien-
tist’s right to engage in therapeutic research.31 
 
ment that “liberty” is the operational word in the Due Process Clause for analyzing sub-
stantive rights.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 28 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, § 10.1.1, at 792. 
 29 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which re-
stricted federal funding for medically necessary abortions, on the ground that it did not 
implicate the right to abortion); accord Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a 
state welfare regulation, which restricted funding for nontherapeutic abortions, on the 
ground that it did not implicate the right to abortion). 
 30 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized an affirmative substantive due process right 
to medical treatment for prisoners, but only because they are “wholly dependent on the 
State.”  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).  While the affirmative right ex-
pressed in Youngberg might seem relevant to the analysis here, “[u]nder current law, it is 
very unlikely that the Court will find that the government has a duty to provide medical 
care except when people are incarcerated or institutionalized by the government.”  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, § 10.5, at 848.  For cases suggesting that a “shocks the con-
science” standard applies to substantive due process challenges to affirmative government 
policies that put the life or health of a person with a special relationship to the govern-
ment in danger, see Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992), Benzman v. 
Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2008), and Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 81 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
 31 A scientist’s right to engage in embryonic stem cell research may emanate from the Due 
Process Clause, see Roger H. Taylor, The Fear of Drawing the Line at Cloning, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 379 (2003) (arguing that scientists have a substantive due process right to prac-
tice their profession, which incorporates a right to engage in therapeutic cloning), or the 
First Amendment.  See Robertson, supra note 19, at 31–38 (arguing that the First Amend-
ment protects a scientist’s right to perform embryonic stem cell research); see also Atossa 
M. Alavi, Note, The Stem Cell Compromise:  A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, Constitutional Implica-
tions of the Bush Plan, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 181 (2003) (same).  For discussions of the the-
ory and scope of First Amendment protection for scientific research broadly, see gener-
ally Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo, and Government:  Toward 
Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978); Gary L. Fran-
cione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 
417 (1988); Dana Remus Irwin, Freedom of Thought:  The First Amendment and the Scientific 
Method, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1479 (2005); John A. Robertson, The Scientist’s Right to Research:  
A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1217–18 (1978) [hereinafter Robertson, 
Scientist’s Right].  Consideration of the scientist’s right to pursue embryonic stem cell re-
search is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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As a matter of doctrine, the Supreme Court generally has applied 
a narrow and a broad conceptual approach in determining whether 
an asserted right is a fundamental liberty within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause.32  Laurence Tribe has described the narrow ap-
proach as a “largely mechanical exercise of isolating ‘fundamental 
rights’ as though they were a historically given set of data points on a 
two-dimensional grid, with one dimension representing time and the 
other representing a carefully defined and circumscribed sequence of 
protected primary activities,” and the broad theory as “akin to deriv-
ing a regression line from a scatter diagram.”33 
Although the Court has applied these approaches in different 
thematic contexts,34 it has consistently evaluated certain factors in de-
ciding whether to recognize rights under both approaches, most im-
portant of which are the history and tradition of the law’s treatment 
of the subject of regulation and the nature of the asserted right at 
stake.35  However, the weight the Court has accorded these factors has 
 
 32 See Robertson, supra note 19, at 8; Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 SMU L. REV. 
1557, 1574–75 (2008).  Several theories of substantive due process have been proposed 
but never fully adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–179 (1980) (arguing that 
courts should only recognize substantive due process rights that facilitate the representa-
tion of minorities and the effective operation of the political processes); HARRY V. JAFFA, 
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION:  A DISPUTED QUESTION 
(1993) (arguing that natural law should serve as the basis for determining what rights 
should be protected under substantive due process); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law 
Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:  Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 
(1973) (arguing that substantive due process requires an inquiry into “the weight of the 
principle in conventional morality” to determine if an asserted right is to be deemed fun-
damental). 
 33 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898–99 (2004); cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated points . . . . It is a 
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbi-
trary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .”). 
 34 For example, the Supreme Court has applied the narrow approach in the right to die 
cases, including Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (find-
ing a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment), Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997) (finding no right to assisted suicide), and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) 
(holding the same under equal protection), but has applied the broad approach in the 
contraception cases, including Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right 
to contraception), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (finding the same under equal 
protection), and Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (reaffirming 
the existence of a right to contraception), and in the abortion cases, including Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a right to abortion) and Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the right to abortion). 
 35 See Sacks, supra note 32, at 1562. 
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varied depending on the context and the approach adopted.36  Given 
the “chaotic” quality of substantive due process jurisprudence,37 it is 
necessary to evaluate how both bear on the question of whether a 
right exists because courts may differ in their approaches to analyzing 
the issue.  Proper consideration of these factors justifies recognition 
of a fundamental right to therapeutic medical treatment, which em-
braces protection against state interference with embryonic stem cell 
research. 
A.  A Legal Tradition of Accommodation for Therapeutic Research 
The Supreme Court has said that an asserted right may be 
deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause if it is “deeply 
rooted in this nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would ex-
ist if they were sacrificed.”38  “The evolution of statutes, changes in 
common understandings, and patterns of non-enforcement of cer-
tain laws are all tools in developing the narrative” of our legal tradi-
tion.39  While the purpose of an analysis of history and tradition is to 
“rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due-
process judicial review,”40 an “attempt to reach a definitive historical 
judgment” is unnecessary.41  To be sure, the Court has made clear 
that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases 
the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”42  There-
fore, history and tradition can be understood as constraints on 
whether an asserted right may legitimately be recognized, but failure 
 
 36 Id. at 1561 (“The Court’s liberty decisions over the past century reveal that the Court has 
in fact reviewed certain objective elements repeatedly in analyzing liberty, despite never 
imposing a duty on itself to consider these elements in every case or identifying them to-
gether in any articulated, unified interpretive method.”). 
 37 Id. at 1558. 
 38 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moore v. City 
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
 39 Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75 
(1998); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 
98–101 (1991) (explaining that an inquiry into history and tradition typically focuses on 
social attitudes and the existence of positive laws encroaching on an asserted right). 
 40 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722. 
 41 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003). 
 42 Id. at 572 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)). 
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to conclude that the right is deeply rooted does not necessarily fore-
close the prospect of constitutional protection.43 
In undertaking an analysis of history and tradition, the Court has 
required that an asserted right be “careful[ly] descri[bed]”44 at an 
appropriate level of abstraction.45  At a rather general level of abstrac-
tion, the asserted right implicated by restrictions on embryonic stem 
cell research may be described as a right to therapeutic medical 
treatment.  At a more specific level of abstraction, the asserted right 
may be described as a right to prospective therapeutic medical treat-
ment derived from embryonic stem cell research.  However, given 
that embryonic stem cell research is a rather recent phenomenon, 
with its earliest breakthroughs only dating back about a decade, it is 
obvious that there is no tradition cutting one way or another at such a 
precise level of abstraction.46  Therefore, “we are left with the prob-
lem of specifying the next most specific tradition.”47  Given the impos-
sibility of ascertaining a level of abstraction that is exactly on point for 
the purposes of this analysis,48 it is more productive to examine the 
asserted right at varying levels of abstraction to understand the poten-
tial bounds imposed by history and tradition. 
To this end, the following analysis considers American legal tradi-
tion with respect to therapeutic medical treatment and research to 
demonstrate that the law has not only historically protected an indi-
vidual’s right to therapeutic treatment, but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, accommodated therapeutic research by remaining free 
of serious legal restrictions until well into the latter half of the twenti-
eth century.  Therefore, as doctrinal constraints, history and tradi-
tion, at a minimum fail to foreclose the possibility of substantive due 
process protection for the asserted right presently at stake, and may 
even provide a sufficient basis to conclude that it is deeply rooted. 
 
 43 See id. at 568.  Professor Friedman and Mr. Smith have suggested that “[i]t is difficult to 
say that proper historical consideration[s] would . . . chang[e] the result” in certain cases.  
Friedman & Smith, supra note 39, at 71 (discussing the Court’s treatment of history in Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
 44 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, § 10.1, at 795 (explaining that in determining whether a 
fundamental right exists under substantive due process, “there . . . is the question of ab-
straction at which the right is stated”). 
 46 See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 39, at 103 (“Of course we do not expect to find such ridicu-
lous traditions because a basic principle of our legal system is that such a rule of law 
would be too specific, and therefore arbitrary.”). 
 47 Id. 
 48 See id. at 101–04. 
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1.  The Historical Basis for an Individual’s Right to Therapeutic Medical 
Treatment 
Scholars have suggested that an inquiry into American history and 
tradition supports recognition of a fundamental right to therapeutic 
medical treatment.  John Robertson has argued that “a right to use 
safe and effective medical treatments . . . could . . . cogently be said to 
be ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’” because: 
The right of doctors to use their clinical judgment in treating the ills of 
patients has long been recognized as part of this professional domain.  
Unlike claims of rights to abortion and assisted suicide, which had to 
confront extensive state restriction of those practices at the time of the 
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no comparable tradi-
tion of legislative restriction on medical practice until well into the twen-
tieth century.49 
In support of this argument, Professor Robertson cites the lack of re-
strictions on the clinical judgment of licensed physicians or on the 
therapies they could administer until the first federal drug law was 
passed in 1914.50  Even so, not until 1962 did the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) establish an approval process in which it 
would ensure the safety and effectiveness of therapies before releas-
ing them to market.51 
Eugene Volokh has provided an alternative historical argument 
that well-established statutory and common law principles of self-
defense justify broad constitutional protection for what he calls “the 
right to medical self-defense,” which incorporates the right of indi-
viduals to use therapeutic medical treatments to defend against 
threats to their life or health.52  According to Professor Volokh: 
[T]he right to medical self-defense is supported by the long-recognized 
right to lethal self-defense:  the right to protect your life against attack 
even if it means killing the attacker.  The lethal self-defense right has 
constitutional foundations in substantive due process, in state constitu-
tional rights to defend life and to bear arms, and perhaps in the Second 
Amendment.  But even setting aside those constitutional roots, the right 
has long been recognized by statute and common law.53 
Professor Volokh supports this argument by citing William Blackstone 
and other early common law commentators for the proposition that 
defending life was considered a natural right at the time of the 
 
 49 Robertson, supra note 19, at 10–11 (citations omitted). 
 50 Id. at 11. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Volokh, supra note 25, at 1815–17. 
 53 Id. at 1815. 
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Founding.54  Moreover, Professor Volokh states that forty-four state 
constitutions currently recognize a right to lethal self-defense, while 
twenty-one, the first of which dates back to 1776, “expressly secure 
the right to ‘defend[] life,’” and forty, dating from 1776 to 1998, “se-
cure a right to keep and bear arms in defense of self, which presup-
poses at least the traditional core of lethal self-defense.”55  As to the 
constitutional dimension of this right, Professor Volokh suggests, 
“[e]ven if due process or the Ninth Amendment is interpreted as 
protecting only those rights recognized as important common law 
rights in 1791 or 1868, self-defense qualifies.”56  In his view, the Su-
preme Court has extended the concept of self-defense to the medical 
context in its abortion jurisprudence by protecting the right of a 
woman to receive an abortion to “defend” herself against a threat to 
her life or health, and this right cannot be logically limited to the 
abortion context.57 
While both Professor Robertson and Professor Volokh acknowl-
edge that their theories do not support an absolute right to therapeu-
tic medical treatment, they nevertheless argue in favor of a rather 
broad conception of this right, which in turn should incorporate em-
bryonic-stem-cell-derived therapies. However, neither theory neces-
sarily justifies extending the scope of the right to therapeutic medical 
treatment to protect against state interference with embryonic stem 
cell research.  As such, a more in-depth inquiry into the law’s histori-
cal treatment of therapeutic research, involving human tissue, fetal 
tissue, and embryos, is necessary to gain a fuller understanding of the 
implications of history and tradition on the propriety of making such 
a move. 
2.  Failed Legislative Initiatives Prior to World War II and the Decline of 
the Antivivisectionist Movement 
Prior to World War II, virtually every federal and state legislative 
initiative to restrain human experimentation failed as a result of pub-
lic support for therapeutic research and the decline in influence of 
the antivivisectionist movement.58  Although the antivivisectionist 
 
 54 Id. at 1819. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 1819–20. 
 57 Id. at 1824. 
 58 See SUSAN E. LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO SCIENCE:  HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN AMERICA 
BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 139 (1995). 
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movement traces its roots back to the mid-nineteenth century, it was 
not until the turn of twentieth century that antivivisectionists under-
took efforts to restrain human experimentation, rather than just an-
imal experimentation.59  In 1900, Jacob H. Gallinger, senior Republi-
can senator from New Hampshire, introduced Senate Bill 3424, the 
first federal legislative proposal for regulating human experimenta-
tion, which sought to impose disclosure, consent, and licensing re-
quirements, and to prohibit experimentation on pregnant women, 
the elderly, the mentally ill, and other incompetents in the District of 
Columbia.60  However, the proposed regulations did not apply to ex-
periments that physicians, scientists, or students performed on one 
another, nor did it apply to experimentation therapeutic to the sub-
ject.61  The bill met harsh criticism and was defeated, as was a new ver-
sion of it in 1902.62  Over the next few years, antivivisectionists spon-
sored similar legislative initiatives in a number of States, including 
Maryland, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, but all of them were rejected.63  
Due to a growing number of reported incidents of experimentation 
on children, Senator Gallinger introduced a bill into the Senate in 
1914 which called for a formal commission to investigate charges of 
human experimentation in public hospitals, and similar proposals 
were introduced in the New Jersey and New York state legislatures.64  
However, none materialized because the charges against the hospitals 
were ultimately dropped.65 
As a result of advances in therapeutic medicine on account of an-
imal and human experimentation, the antivivisectionist movement 
experienced a serious decline in support and influence in the years 
 
 59 Id. at 27–29.  Although around this time, antivivisectionist groups largely concentrated 
their efforts on preventing experimentation on animals, they were concerned that animal 
vivisection would inevitably lead to experimentation on human beings.  Id. at 28.  By 
1909, the American Humane Association, which was founded as a national organization 
in 1874 to coordinate the activities of local humane societies, was reporting that of the 
334 societies in the United States, 104 were devoting their efforts solely to animals, 45 to 
children, and 185 to both animal and child protection.  Id. at 29.  Although prominent 
groups sought the complete eradication of vivisection, others took a more moderate ap-
proach, favoring reform, regulation, and exceptions for experimentation therapeutic to 
the subject instead.  Id. at 34. 
 60 WOLFGANG WEYERS, THE ABUSE OF MAN:  AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF DUBIOUS MEDICAL 
EXPERIMENTATION 200–02 (2003). 
 61 LEDERER, supra note 58, at 71–72. 
 62 WEYERS, supra note 60, at 202. 
 63 LEDERER, supra note 58, at 74–75. 
 64 Id. at 89. 
 65 Id. 
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leading up to the time the United States entered World War I.66  In 
particular, major setbacks resulted from the movement’s opposition 
to experimentation generally supported by the public, such as the 
vaccination of soldiers for typhoid, the military’s use of animals in 
medical experiments before World War I, and the funding of the Red 
Cross’s investigation into the nature and prevention of disease afflict-
ing soldiers during the war.67  While the movement had a resurgence 
in the 1930s due to concern about reports of experimentation on 
prisoners, soldiers, volunteer subjects, and children,68 its influence 
was mitigated not only by medical successes, such as the discovery of 
insulin through experiments on dogs, but also an increasing confi-
dence in the medical profession and a reduction in public suspicion 
of dubious research.69  It was not until the Nuremberg Doctor’s Trial 
after World War II, which revealed a pervasive practice of human ex-
perimentation by the Nazis, that the public and medical community 
thought some type of regulatory framework for experimentation was 
necessary. 70 
3.  The Nuremberg Code as a Regulatory False Start 
The Nuremberg Code represented the first “legalistic” guidelines 
worldwide with respect to medical research.71  The Code sets forth ten 
principles to govern the practice of human experimentation, includ-
ing informed and voluntary consent requirements, a provision requir-
ing the purpose of an experiment to be for the benefit of society, sa-
feguards against injury or death to the subject, and provisions 
allowing for the prompt termination of the experiment by the scien-
tist or the subject.72  In 1953, the National Institutes of Health, an 
agency currently of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices charged with conducting and supporting medical research, 
adopted research guidelines based on the Code.73  While American 
courts could use the Code as a basis for imposing criminal or civil li-
 
 66 WEYERS, supra note 60, at 213. 
 67 LEDERER, supra note 58, at 102. 
 68 Id. at 103. 
 69 WEYERS, supra note 60, at 213–14; LEDERER, supra note 58, at 125. 
 70 WEYERS, supra note 60, at 351. 
 71 Id. at 351, 383–84. 
 72 NUREMBERG CODE, reprinted at THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE:  HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 2 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 
1992). 
 73 See WEYERS, supra note 60, at 381. 
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ability, no court to date has imposed either on account of a violation 
of the Code.74  Immediately after the Code’s adoption, the propriety 
of applying it in the United States was questioned because it exces-
sively constrained medical research, given that it was tailored to the 
deliberately cruel experimentation practiced by the Nazis, in which 
death was viewed as an acceptable outcome of study and ethnic and 
political groups were specifically targeted as subjects.75  Therefore, 
since the Code did not reflect the realities of the practice in the 
United States, it eventually “lost its binding character and came to be 
viewed as an informal set of recommendations.”76 
In response to the Nuremberg Code’s deficiencies, the World 
Medical Association adopted the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964.77  
Although the Declaration was based on many of the same principles 
as the Code, it did not address consent of subjects and was overall far 
more “permissive” than the Code.78  More importantly, however, the 
Declaration only provided non-binding “recommendations as a guide 
to each doctor in clinical research,” and therefore did not carry with 
it the force of law.79  Nevertheless, the Declaration represented an at-
tempt to develop universal standards of medical ethics that would 
better suit the practice of human experimentation than the Nurem-
berg Code.80 
4.  Informed Consent’s Departure from Legal Tradition 
Despite the Nuremberg Code’s inability to provide an appropriate 
regulatory framework for medical research in the United States, the 
common law doctrine of informed consent became “a cardinal prin-
ciple for judging the propriety of research with human beings” in the 
aftermath of World War II.81  However, informed consent was dis-
tinctly different from the traditional doctrine of consent that previ-
ously governed the physician-patient relationship.82  The modern doc-
trine of informed consent, as we know it today—in which a physician 
 
 74 Id. at 361. 
 75 See id. at 358 (emphasizing the “woeful lack of respect given to an individual test subject 
by the Germans”). 
 76 Id. at 384. 
 77 Id. at 382. 
 78 Id. at 382–84. 
 79 Id. at 384. 
 80 See id. at 382. 
 81 JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS:  THE AUTHORITY OF THE INVESTIGATOR, 
SUBJECT, PROFESSIONS, AND STATE IN THE HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS 523 (1972). 
 82 See WEYERS, supra note 60, at 178; KATZ, supra note 81, at 525–29. 
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may be liable for negligence in a malpractice suit if she breaches her 
duty to inform a patient with adequate information of the attendant 
risks of a procedure, or for battery if the physician’s failure to inform 
is found to have invalidated the patient’s voluntary consent to the 
procedure—derives from two state court decisions, Salgo v. Leland 
Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees83 and Natanson v. Kline,84 handed 
down in 1957 and 1960, respectively.85  The idea espoused by these 
cases, that consent must not only be voluntary but also adequately in-
formed, was a novel innovation to the simpler traditional doctrine of 
consent:  that the performance by a physician of a medical procedure 
without a patient’s written consent results in an assault and battery 
for which the physician is liable.86  Although American courts began 
applying the traditional doctrine of consent in the late nineteenth 
century,87 the modern doctrine of informed consent “constituted a 
radical break with the silence that had been the hallmark of physi-
cian-patient interactions throughout the ages.”88 
5.  The Rise of Modern Legislative Restrictions on Therapeutic Research 
It was not until the 1970s that any significant federal or state legis-
lation restraining human experimentation existed.89  In 1974, Con-
gress enacted the National Research Act in response to public outcry 
over several widely publicized cases of experimentation, including the 
revelation of experiments involving the infection of mentally chal-
lenged children with hepatitis at the Willowbrook School, the injec-
tion of live cancer cells into elderly patients at the Jewish Chronic 
Disease Hospital, and the infection of hundreds of African American 
men with syphilis by the U.S. Public Health Service in the infamous 
Tuskegee Experiment.90  The Act mandated formal protections 
 
 83 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). 
 84 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960). 
 85 Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
69, 72 (1994). 
 86 See KATZ, supra note 81, at 525–29; WEYERS, supra note 60, at 178. 
 87 See KATZ, supra note 81, at 525–29; WEYERS, supra note 60, at 178. 
 88 Katz, supra note 85, at 72. 
 89 See id.; M.H. PAPPWORTH, HUMAN GUINEA PIGS:  EXPERIMENTATION ON MAN 201 (1968) 
(“[A]lthough it is technically inaccurate to state that ‘there is no law’ on the subject of 
human experimentation, it is true that there are no statutes and no reported cases deal-
ing directly with clinical investigation as such.  However, medical research activity, like all 
activities in our society, is subject to common-law principles of general applicability.”). 
 90 LEDERER, supra note 58, at 140; see also JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD:  THE TUSKEGEE 
SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 1 (2d ed. 1993). 
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against human experimentation, including written consent require-
ments and institutional review boards responsible for evaluating pro-
posals to experiment on human subjects, and with some modification 
has remained intact since.91 
The National Research Act also established the National Commis-
sion for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research, which subsequently issued two relevant reports in the 
late 1970s:  the Belmont Report92 and Research on the Fetus Report.93  
The Belmont Report articulated three basic principles intended to 
guide investigators in the course of their research in general:  respect 
for persons, beneficence, and justice.94  The Research on the Fetus 
Report made several recommendations with respect to the perform-
ance of fetal experimentation.95  Notably, the report concluded that 
“[t]herapeutic research directed toward the pregnant woman may be 
conducted or supported, and should be encouraged,” provided the 
woman gives her informed consent and the research places the fetus 
at as little risk as possible without affecting the health needs of the 
woman.96  While the report also concluded that research not thera-
peutic to the fetus could be conducted, it recommended that such re-
search be more limited.97 
In response to the Research on the Fetus Report, the Health De-
partment promulgated regulations that provided federal funding for 
fetal experimentation, subject to various limitations.98  The regula-
tions conditioned research on the fetus ex utero on parental consent 
and required that such research be therapeutic to the fetus or that 
the risk to the fetus be minimal.99  Moreover, the regulations left the 
 
 91 LEDERER, supra note 58, at 141–42. 
 92 See NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, BELMONT REPORT:  
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
RESEARCH (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT]. 
 93 See NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RESEARCH ON THE FETUS 
(1975) [hereinafter RESEARCH ON THE FETUS]. 
 94 See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 92. 
 95 RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 93, at 73–76. 
 96 Id. at 73 (emphasis added). 
 97 See id. at 73–76. 
 98 Nicolas P. Terry, “Alas!  Poor Yorick,” I Knew Him Ex Utero:  The Regulation of Embryo and 
Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States, 39 VAND. L. REV. 419, 
444–45 (1986). 
 99 Id. 
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job of regulating research on a dead fetus or fetal material to the 
States.100 
Although all fifty States plus the District of Columbia adopted the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act—which permitted research on a dead 
fetus and fetal material, provided that one parent gave consent and 
the other did not object101—several States, in the wake of Roe v. 
Wade,102 passed legislation imposing restrictions on fetal experimenta-
tion.103  In 1975, five States had laws on their books prohibiting re-
search on the dead fetus but only if it was the product of induced 
abortions.104  Criminal and civil laws in various States had already sa-
feguarded the fetus in utero from life-threatening intentional injury, 
and if born alive from death or impairment,105 but the common law 
permitted research therapeutic to the viable fetus.106  Furthermore, 
twenty-one States recognized causes of action for injuries to the viable 
fetus that led to its stillbirth.107  Nevertheless, courts invalidated a 
number of these fetal experimentation laws on the grounds that they 
were unconstitutionally vague or infringed on a woman’s right to 
abortion.108 
6.  Current Government Treatment of Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
Current state laws restricting embryonic stem cell research derive 
from older laws originally enacted to address fetal experimentation, 
abortion, and in vitro fertilization.109  While the current restrictions 
do not all directly prohibit embryonic stem cell research, they never-
theless limit scientists’ ability to engage in it.  A number of States still 
restrict research on aborted fetuses or embryos, although some allow 
it if consent is given by the patient.110  Approximately half the States 
restrict the sale of fetuses or embryos.111  South Dakota prohibits re-
search on all embryos, even those created outside a woman’s body, 
and on cells or tissues derived from embryos created outside a wom-
 
100 Id. 
101 See RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 93, at 25. 
102 410 U.S. 113 (1972). 
103 See generally Terry, supra note 98, at 446–49 (providing a synopsis of these statutes). 
104 See RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 93, at 25. 
105 Id. at 27. 
106 Id. at 26. 
107 Id. at 27. 
108 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
109 STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 15. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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an’s body.112  Louisiana expressly prohibits research on in vitro fertil-
ized embryos.113  Arkansas, Indiana, Michigan, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota prohibit nuclear transfer cloning, even for therapeutic 
research.114  It is uncertain if Virginia also bans research on cloned 
embryos because the State’s law on the subject is open to textual in-
terpretation.115 
In recent years, there has been a tendency to relax previously ex-
isting restrictions in order to promote certain forms of embryonic 
stem cell research.  In 2007, Iowa repealed its ban on nuclear transfer 
cloning.116  Additionally, in 2008, even though the State’s ban on nu-
clear transfer cloning remains in place, Michigan voters passed a con-
stitutional amendment permitting research on excess embryos from 
fertility clinics.117  Previously, Michigan prohibited research on live 
embryos altogether.118 
Despite the restrictive approaches of some States, others have tak-
en the opposite path and allocated significant funding to embryonic 
stem cell research programs as a testament to the confidence in their 
therapeutic potential.  Most impressively in 2004, California voters 
passed Proposition 71, which allocated $3 billion to embryonic and 
other types of stem cell research initiatives in the State.119  In addition, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
and Wisconsin authorized state funding for such ends, either by vir-
tue of legislation or executive order.120 
At the federal level, President Obama issued an executive order 
on March 9, 2009, lifting a ban on federal funding for embryonic 
stem cell research imposed by President Bush in 2001, even though  
the Dickey-Wicker amendment—legislation that prohibits federal 
funding for the creation or destruction of a human embryo for re-
search purposes—remains in place.121  Before imposing the federal 
funding ban on all future stem cell lines, President Bush made ap-
 
112 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-14-16, -17, -20, 34-23A-17 (2006). 
113 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122, 14:87.2 (2004). 
114 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-1001 to -1004, 20-17-802 (2005); IND. CODE § 35-46-5-1 (2005); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.16274-16275, 333.20197, 333.26401-26403, 750.430a (2006); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-02 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-14-16, 17, 20, 34-23A-17 
(2006). 
115 VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.22 (2004); see also STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 15. 
116 IOWA CODE §§ 707B.1-4 (1979) (repealed 2007). 
117 MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 27. 
118 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.2685 (2006). 
119 See STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 15. 
120 See id. 
121 Stolberg, supra note 16; see also MOONEY, supra note 3, at 195–96. 
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proximately twenty-two existing stem cell lines eligible for federal 
funding.122  In justifying his decision to lift the federal funding ban, 
President Obama explained that a majority of Americans “have come 
to a consensus that we should pursue this research; that the potential 
it offers is great, and with proper guidelines and strict oversight the 
perils can be avoided.”123 
7.  A Look Back at History 
Despite greater regulation of therapeutic treatment and research 
in the late-twentieth century, it cannot be said that there exists a legal 
tradition of restraint.  To the contrary, given the generally persistent 
rejection of serious constraints on therapeutic research as a result of 
public support for its rich therapeutic benefits, it would be more ac-
curate to characterize this nation’s legal tradition with respect to sub-
ject at hand as one of accommodation.  Whether this demonstrates 
that an individual’s right to therapeutic medical treatment, which 
protects against state interference with embryonic stem cell research, 
is deeply rooted is not entirely clear.  But it is enough to say that the 
historical record, at a minimum, should not foreclose the possibility 
of extending substantive due process protection to embryonic stem 
cell research. 
B.  Constitutional Protection Against State Interference with Therapeutic 
Research 
Since history and tradition do not preclude recognizing a funda-
mental right to therapeutic medical treatment that embraces protec-
tion against state interference with embryonic stem cell research, as 
demonstrated in Part II.A, it is necessary to evaluate whether constitu-
tional precedent justifies such recognition.124  Indeed, “the elabora-
tion of constitutional values proceeds mostly from prior decisions.”125  
 
122 MOONEY, supra note 3, at 198–201.  President Bush subsequently vetoed two bills that 
would have lifted the ban, and in 2007 issued an executive order intended to encourage 
scientists to pursue alternative research methods that would not destroy human embryos. 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Vetoes Bill Removing Stem Cell Limits, Saying ‘All Human Life Is Sa-
cred,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at A21. 
123 Stolberg, supra note 16. 
124 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–79 (2003). 
125 TRIBE & DORF, supra note 39, at 71; accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence 
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1987) (recognizing 
“arguments based on judicial precedent” as one of five primary types of constitutional ar-
guments). 
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Typically, “[t]he starting point of the analysis [is] Supreme Court 
cases” and “new issue[s] will presumptively be decided according to 
the logic that those cases expressed.”126 
An analysis of case law demonstrates not only that the Supreme 
Court has recognized a fundamental right to therapeutic medical 
treatment in the abortion context, but also that lower courts have ex-
tended this right to encompass protection against state interference 
with research related to the development of abortion techniques ne-
cessary to preserve a mother’s life or health.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has intimated a willingness to expand the scope of this right to 
other therapeutic treatment contexts.  The logic of these cases should 
justify due process protection against state interference with embry-
onic stem cell research as well. 
1.  The Right to Therapeutic Abortion 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized a fundamental 
right to therapeutic medical treatment in its abortion jurisprudence.  
Roe v. Wade127 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Ca-
sey128 can be understood as holding that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects two different kinds of abortion rights.129  The first right is to non-
therapeutic abortion where a woman has the right “to choose to have 
an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interfer-
ence from the State.”130  The second right is to therapeutic abortion, 
which “forbids a State to interfere with a woman’s choice to undergo 
an abortion procedure [even after viability] if continuing her preg-
nancy would constitute a threat to her health.”131  In order to protect 
 
126 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 39 
(1997) (criticizing this approach because it tends to “distanc[e] us from the original text 
and understanding”). 
127 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
128 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
129 Volokh, supra note 25, at 1824. 
130 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
131 Id. at 880; accord Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (“Since the law 
requires a health exception in order to validate even a postviability abortion regulation, it 
at a minimum requires the same in respect to previability regulation.”); id. at 948 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Because even a postviability proscription of abortion would 
be invalid absent a health exception, Nebraska’s ban on previability partial birth abor-
tions, under the circumstances presented here, must include a health exception as well, 
since the State’s interest in regulating abortions before viability is ‘considerably weaker’ 
than after viability.”). 
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the right to therapeutic abortion, the Court has required two excep-
tions in any law regulating or proscribing abortion “where it is neces-
sary, in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life 
or health of the mother.”132  In other words, even in an otherwise va-
lid abortion law, one exception is required to ensure a woman’s ac-
cess to an abortion in order to combat life-threatening risks, and an-
other is required to ensure her access to an abortion in order to 
combat other “significant health risks . . . . with substantial and irre-
versible consequences”133—whether they be physical, psychological, or 
emotional.134  These exceptions are required not only in “situations 
where the pregnancy itself creates a threat,” but also “where state 
regulations force women to use riskier methods of abortion.”135  This 
means that the absence of a safer alternative procedure entitles a 
woman to the regulated procedure should her life or health so de-
mand.136  According to the Court, these principles derive from the 
long-standing view that “a State may promote but not endanger a 
woman’s health when it regulates the methods of abortion.”137  As 
such, when evaluating laws implicating the right to therapeutic abor-
tion, the Court has always applied heightened scrutiny.138  This treat-
ment is testament to the Court’s implicit value judgment that indi-
 
   Eugene Volokh describes the rights to nontherapeutic and therapeutic abortion as 
the “abortion-as-choice” right and the “abortion-as-self-defense” right, respectively.  Vo-
lokh, supra note 25, at 1824–25.  According to Professor Volokh: 
[The rights recognized in] Roe and Casey . . . are different in scope, justification, 
and popular support.  The first is the highly controversial right to abortion as re-
productive choice, which generally allows previability abortions for all women who 
choose them.  The second is the right to abortion even after viability but only 
when necessary “to preserve the life or health of the mother”—a right to defend 
oneself using medical care, even when this requires destroying the source of the 
threat. 
  Id. at 1824 (citations omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64).  
Professor Volokh argues that the latter right is primarily supported by the traditional 
common law and statutory tort principle of lethal self-defense, which should protect ac-
cess to other medical treatments in addition to the abortion procedure.  See Volokh, supra 
note 25, at 1824–28. 
132 Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 931 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879). 
133 Casey, 505 U.S. at 880. 
134 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191–92 (1973). 
135 Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 931. 
136 See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (holding that the existence of 
a safer alternative procedure obviated the need for a health exception in a law proscrib-
ing another procedure). 
137 Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 931 (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 768–69 (1986); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 76–79 (1976); Doe, 410 U.S. at 197). 
138 See discussion infra Part III. 
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vidual interests in life and health deserve substantial constitutional 
protection. 
Indeed, concern for women’s interests in life and health has al-
ways been an “important theme”139 in justifying protection for the 
abortion right.  While all of the opinions in Roe touched on this con-
cern,140 Justice Douglas went so far in his concurrence as to frame the 
right at issue as coming under the rubric of “the freedom to care for 
one’s health and person,” given that “[t]he vicissitudes of life pro-
duce pregnancies . . . which may impair ‘health’ . . . [or] imperil the 
life of the mother, or which in the full setting of the case may create 
such suffering, dislocations, misery, or tragedy as to make an early 
abortion the only civilized step to take.”141  When the Court reaf-
firmed Roe’s essential holdings in Casey almost two decades later, the 
plurality rested its decision in part on the health implications of re-
quiring a woman to carry a pregnancy to term.142  According to the 
plurality: 
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled 
to proscribe it in all instances.  That is because the liberty of the woman 
is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the 
law.  The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to 
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.  That these sacri-
fices have from the beginning of the human race been endured by 
woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to 
the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist 
she make the sacrifice.  Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the 
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, 
 
139 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980). 
140 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining that should the State deny preg-
nant women the abortion choice, “[s]pecific and direct harm medically diagnosable even 
in early pregnancy may be involved”); id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that “the 
interests of a woman in giving of her physical and emotional self during preg-
nancy . . . are of a far greater degree of significance and personal intimacy” than other 
substantive due process rights previously recognized by the Court (quoting Abele v. 
Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Conn. 1972)); id. at 207 (Burger, J., concurring) (em-
phasizing that the statutes before the Court “impermissibly limit the performance of 
abortions necessary to protect the health of pregnant women, using the term health in its 
broadest medical context”); see also infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text (discussing 
the dissenting opinions of then-Justice Rehnquist and Justice White with respect to their 
take on the Constitution’s protection for women’s health interests).  But see McRae, 448 
U.S. at 316 (questioning “whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due process liberty 
recognized in [Roe]”); Hill, supra note 25, at 310 (noting that the majority opinion in Roe 
“did not explain [its] holding [regarding the right to therapeutic abortion] beyond say-
ing that the state’s interest in the fetus becomes compelling at the point of viability”). 
141 Roe, 410 U.S. at 215–16 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
142 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1973). 
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however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and 
our culture.143 
This interpretation followed a line of reasoning expressed in earlier 
cases that because a pregnancy is by nature dangerous and thus ipso 
facto increases the risk to a woman’s health and potentially her life, 
the decision to terminate it commands special protection.144 
In contrast to the widespread disagreement over the degree of 
constitutional protection for the nontherapeutic abortion right or 
even the propriety of protecting it at all,145 there is general acceptance 
that the therapeutic abortion right should be protected to a greater 
extent.146  To be sure, even when the Casey plurality dispensed with 
Roe’s trimester framework and substituted the less demanding undue 
burden standard for the standard of strict scrutiny that previously go-
verned the nontherapeutic abortion right, the plurality left Roe’s re-
quirements with respect to the life and health exceptions completely 
 
143 Id. 
144 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979) (invalidating on vagueness grounds a 
law requiring physicians, when performing abortions, to use the procedure with the best 
chance of preserving the life of the fetus, given that the law “d[id] not clearly spec-
ify . . . that the woman’s life and health must always prevail over the fetus’s life and health 
when they conflict” because the government may not “requir[e] a physician to make a 
‘trade-off’ between the woman’s health and additional percentage points of fetal sur-
vival”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78–79 (1976) (invali-
dating a law prohibiting amniocentesis, one of the most common abortion procedures 
nationwide, in part because it was “safer, with respect to maternal mortality, than even 
continuation of the pregnancy until normal childbirth”). 
   It is also arguable that the Casey plurality justified recognition of the nontherapeutic 
abortion right, and not just the therapeutic abortion right, on concern for women’s 
health interests.  However, the plurality seemed to view this concern not as a primary jus-
tification for the nontherapeutic abortion right, but rather as inextricably bound up in 
the decision to reproduce.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852–53 (explaining that an abortion “in-
volve[s] personal decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also hu-
man responsibility and respect for it,” and is thus “in some critical respects . . . of the 
same character as the decision to use contraception” (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a fundamental right to contraception under substantive due 
process), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (finding a fundamental right to contra-
ception under equal protection), and Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 
(1977) (reaffirming the existence of a fundamental right to contraception))).  Neverthe-
less, the nontherapeutic abortion right can still be understood to protect against inherent 
health risks in a normal pregnancy, which any pregnant woman assumes merely by choos-
ing to reproduce.  Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (explaining that the therapeutic abortion 
right protects against risks to a woman’s life and against other significant risks to her 
health). 
145 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, How to Reverse Government Imposition of Immorality:  A Strategy 
for Eroding Roe v. Wade, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (2007); John Hart Ely, The Wages of 
Crying Wolf:  A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947–49 (1973); John T. Noonan, 
Jr., Commentary, The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668, 673 (1984). 
146 See Volokh, supra note 25, at 1825. 
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intact.147  Perhaps even more indicative of the therapeutic abortion 
right’s durable place in substantive due process jurisprudence is its 
embrace, however moderate, by some of the most ardent opponents 
of the nontherapeutic right who have served on the Court.148  For ex-
ample, in his dissent in Roe, then-Justice Rehnquist, without recogniz-
ing abortion as a fundamental right, explained that if a statute “were 
to prohibit an abortion even where the mother’s life is in jeopardy, 
[there would be] little doubt that such a statute would lack a rational 
relation to a valid state objective”149—or in other words, it would be 
unconstitutional under rational basis review.  Additionally, Justice 
White’s dissent in Roe implied that if the plaintiff had alleged that her 
life or health was threatened, the case would present an entirely dif-
ferent constitutional question.150  Most notably, however, the full 
Court recently agreed, in the only unanimous abortion decision to 
date, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,151 that a state 
statute requiring minors to obtain parental notice to receive an abor-
tion was unconstitutional on the ground that it lacked a health ex-
ception.152  According to the Court, “a State may not restrict access to 
abortions that are necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for 
the preservation of the life or health of the mother” and that “it 
would be unconstitutional to apply the Act in a manner that subjects 
minors to significant health risks.”153  Though unremarkable in its re-
statement of the law, the decision even gained the support of Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, who both had dissented in every Supreme Court 
decision invalidating abortion laws during their tenures on the 
bench.154  Michael Dorf suggests that the best explanation for this 
outcome is that since the case involved a highly restrictive law, Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas did not necessarily consider it to be an abor-
tion case, but rather a case about health more broadly.155 
That said, the therapeutic abortion right is not without limitation.  
In the Court’s most recent abortion case, Gonzales v. Carhart (“Carhart 
 
147 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79. 
148 See Volokh, supra note 25, at 1825 (citing then-Justice Rehnquist as an example). 
149 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
150 Roe, 410 U.S. at 222–23 (White, J., dissenting). 
151 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
152 Id. at 323–24. 
153 Id. at 327–28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
154 These cases include Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992), and Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
155 See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court’s Surprisingly Unanimous Abortion Decision:  A Parting 
Gift for Justice O’Connor?, FINDLAW, Jan. 30, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20060130.html. 
 
1102 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:4 
 
II”),156 it upheld the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which 
prohibited the dilation and extraction (“D&X”) abortion procedure, 
even though the Act did not include a health exception.157  According 
to the Court, the test to determine whether the Act required a health 
exception was whether the prohibited procedure was ever necessary, 
in professional medical judgment, to protect a woman’s health.158 
Since the Court found that there was uncertainty in the medical 
community on this point and that adequate alternative procedures 
were available to protect women’s health, it believed legislative defer-
ence was warranted.159  In so holding, the Court said: 
The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over whether 
the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health, giv-
en the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be 
safe alternatives.160 
However, the Court made clear that its holding did not detract from 
the value of the liberty interests at stake.  Rather, the Court disagreed 
with the manner in which the case was brought—as a facial challenge 
instead of an as-applied challenge.  In the Court’s view: 
This is the proper manner to protect the health of the woman if it can be 
shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition 
has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act 
must be used.  In an as-applied challenge the nature of the medical risk 
can be better quantified and balanced than in a facial attack.161 
Therefore, had circumstances shown that the Act indeed threatened 
a woman’s health by virtue of its prohibition of the D&X procedure, 
the outcome likely would have been different.162 
2.  Constitutional Protection for Fetal Experimentation as a Necessary 
Precursor Activity to the Exercise of the Right to Therapeutic Abortion 
The Supreme Court has intimated that the right to therapeutic 
abortion encompasses protection against state interference with the 
development of prospective safe and effective abortion procedures.  
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,163 the Court struck down 
 
156 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
157 Id. at 1639. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1631–37. 
160 Id. at 1638. 
161 Id. at 1638–39. 
162 The standard of review the Supreme Court adopted in Carhart II and its implications for 
laws restricting embryonic stem cell research are discussed infra Part III. 
163 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
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a state statute that prohibited saline amniocentesis—one of the most 
common abortion procedures after the first trimester nationwide—
because, “as a practical matter, it forces a woman and her physician to 
terminate her pregnancy by methods more dangerous to her health 
than the method outlawed.”164  According to the Court, one of “sev-
eral significant facts” that formed the basis for this conclusion was 
that the language of the statute not only included within its proscrip-
tion saline amniocentesis but also “other methods that may be developed in 
the future and that may prove highly effective and completely safe.”165  There-
fore, by invalidating the statute, the Court was removing what it 
viewed as an unconstitutional burden to future access to “other 
methods” of abortion that did not yet exist.  And despite the fact that 
their development was speculative, the Court still believed that bur-
dening such access implicated women’s constitutionally protected in-
terest in health.  Based on the Court’s analysis in Danforth, it is no 
great leap to suggest that the Court would be equally willing to pro-
tect the process of development of prospective abortion procedures if 
it was so inclined to protect the procedures themselves. 
Indeed, lower courts have relied on this notion of constitutional 
protection for potentially safe and effective abortion procedures in 
invalidating laws proscribing fetal experimentation by physicians and 
scientists.  These cases can be framed as protecting against state inter-
ference with the practice of fetal experimentation because it is a nec-
essary precursor activity to the exercise of a constitutional right, 
namely a woman’s right to therapeutic abortion.166  In Forbes v. Napoli-
tano,167 the Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona statute prohibiting 
experimentation on fetal tissue obtained from induced abortions, ex-
cept for the therapeutic benefit of the fetus or the mother.168  How-
ever, the plaintiffs—patients suffering from Parkinson’s disease and 
 
164 Id. at 79. 
165 Id. at 77–78 (emphasis added). 
166 See Robertson, supra note 19, at 34 (explaining that it would be “paradoxical to find that 
the state could not prohibit the use of safe and effective ESC medical treatments but 
could prohibit the scientific and clinical research necessary to determine whether they 
were safe and effective”).  The Supreme Court has traditionally relied on the necessary 
precursor rationale in its First Amendment jurisprudence to protect a number of activi-
ties without which the exercise of the right to free speech would not be possible.  See Ex 
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“Liberty of circulating is as essential to that free-
dom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of 
little value.”); Robertson, Scientist’s Right, supra note 31, at 1215–18 (analogizing research 
to protected newsgathering and reporting). 
167 236 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2000). 
168 Id. at 1012–13. 
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physicians who believed fetal research held out considerable promise 
for developing various therapeutic and fertility treatments—argued, 
inter alia, that despite the health exception the statute “prevent[ed] 
patients from receiving critical medical care without compelling or 
even rational justification, thus violating [their] rights to privacy and 
liberty guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.”169  While the 
court did not reach this issue and instead decided the case on vague-
ness grounds,170 Judge Sneed, in a concurring opinion, agreed with 
the plaintiffs’ substantive due process theory on the basis that the sta-
tute contravened the teachings of the Supreme Court’s abortion ju-
risprudence.171  According to Judge Sneed, not only would the prohi-
bition of fetal experimentation prevent the development of 
therapeutic medical treatments and diagnostic techniques, but it 
would also prevent the development of a variety of technologies that 
bear on the choice to have an abortion: 
Roe and its progeny established that the pregnant woman has a right to 
be free from state interference with her choice to have an abortion. . . .  
 A prohibition on aborted fetal tissue research could burden the 
rights of women and couples to make both present and future reproduc-
tive choices.  Fetal tissue experimentation may aid in the development 
and continued improvement of techniques and procedures necessary to 
make such choices.  Prohibiting research on aborted fetal tissue could 
prevent the advancement of important diagnostic techniques, the crea-
tion of safer abortion techniques, and the discovery of medical defects 
that would influence a woman’s decision regarding future pregnancies.172 
To Judge Sneed, of the three asserted state interests in support of the 
statute—promoting the health of the mother, protecting potential fe-
tal life, and regulating the medical profession—none justified the 
prohibition of fetal experimentation because such conduct was effec-
tively a necessary precursor activity to the exercise of the right to 
abortion, therapeutic or otherwise.173 
 
169 Forbes v. Woods, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1016–17 (D. Ariz. 1999), aff’d sub nom., Napolitano, 
236 F.3d 1009. 
170 Napolitano, 236 F.3d at 1010–13.  See generally Woods, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (noting that 
“[t]here is a longstanding precedent that courts should decide constitutional issues on 
the narrowest grounds possible” (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501 
(1985)). 
171 Napolitano, 236 F.3d at 1013–14 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
172 Id. at 1014. 
173 Id. 
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In a similar vein, a Louisiana district court, in Margaret S. v. 
Treen,174 relied on the necessary-precursor-activity rationale to invali-
date a state law that prohibited experimentation on an aborted fetus, 
whether aborted alive or dead, except for the therapeutic benefit of 
the fetus.175  The plaintiffs—two pregnant women and three physi-
cians—alleged, inter alia, that the statute prohibited procedures “ne-
cessary to preserve the life or health of the mother” and would have 
“the disastrous effect of preventing scientific research.”176  In the 
court’s words: 
[T]his statute unduly limits the medical information obtainable through 
experimentation . . . . which might be therapeutic to the wom-
an . . . . [E]nforcement of [the statute] would substantially burden the 
right of women in Louisiana to choose specifically to terminate their 
pregnancies.  The prohibition on experimentation involving aborted fe-
tal tissue is likely to impede the thorough, complete pathological exami-
nation of such tissue, thereby potentially endangering the health of 
women who choose abortion.  The Court finds that this statute, which 
carries substantial criminal penalties, would cause pathologists to refrain 
from using experimental procedures to diagnose possible infections or 
illnesses in women who have undergone abortions.  The denial of such 
health care for women having abortions is a significant burden on their 
right to chose [sic] to terminate their pregnancies.177 
Since the statute did not further the asserted state interest in “pro-
tecting the pregnant woman’s health” and the evidence established 
that there was “no threat to the public health from the use of aborted 
tissue in experimentation,” the district court held the statute uncon-
stitutional.178 
 
174 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 
794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).  Prior to the filing of the lawsuit in Margaret S. v. Treen, the 
same plaintiffs filed a similar lawsuit in which a district court upheld the previous itera-
tion of the fetal-experimentation statute because it only purported to regulate experi-
mentation of in-utero fetuses.  See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 
1980).  In response to the judgment, the Louisiana legislature amended the statute to 
impose tighter restrictions on fetal experimentation.  See Treen, 597 F. Supp. at 672–73.  
Notably, the court in Margaret S. v. Treen distinguished the prior case on the basis that the 
statute “has since been amended to include a fetus ‘whether alive or dead’ . . . . [and] the 
plaintiffs in [Margaret S. v. Edwards] presented no evidence that the prior version of [the 
statute] imposed a significant burden on any fundamental right.”  Id. at 672–73 (citations 
omitted). 
175 Id. at 671 n.29. 
176 Id. at 672. 
177 Id. at 673 (citations omitted). 
178 Id. at 674–75. 
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Although the Fifth Circuit, in Margaret S. v. Edwards,179 affirmed 
this judgment on vagueness grounds, Judge Williams wrote a separate 
concurring opinion agreeing with the rationale of the district court.  
In a rather sharp critique of the majority’s failure to consider the sub-
stantive due process issue and its “completely one-sided emphasis”180 
on the extant opposition to the Supreme Court’s abortion jurispru-
dence, Judge Williams went out of his way to say that “[t]he majority’s 
analysis strains unnecessarily to restrict the scope of this case, result-
ing in unrealistic and unconvincing justifications for the decision.”181  
Refusing to frame the claim at issue as one sounding in vagueness, he 
stated:  “It is a claim that a ban on experimentation will inevitably 
preclude the development of tests that may prove beneficial in future 
medical and surgical treatment[, . . . which] is in actuality a claim on 
the merits.”182  After explaining that the statute did not have any rea-
sonable relationship to an important state interest, despite the State’s 
“admittedly broad” regulatory authority in the context of medical ex-
perimentation, Judge Williams concluded that “under the guise of 
police regulation the State has actually undertaken to discourage 
constitutionally privileged induced abortions.”183  As such, Judge Wil-
liams for all intents and purposes adopted the district court’s analysis 
treating fetal experimentation as a necessary precursor activity to the 
exercise of a constitutional right. 
The adoption of the necessary-precursor-activity rationale demon-
strates that courts do not necessarily see a causation problem in pro-
tecting research under the rubric of the right to therapeutic abor-
tion.  In theory, there is inherent uncertainty in the prospect of 
developing therapeutic treatments from research because the re-
search might not ultimately deliver the benefits that scientists hope.  
As a result, the connection between research and therapeutic treat-
ment might be perceived as too attenuated, which could create issues 
of standing184 or causation on the merits when balancing the compet-
 
179 794 F.2d 994. 
180 Id. at 999 (Williams, J., concurring). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1001. 
183 Id. at 1002. 
184 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (requiring a plaintiff to prove that an al-
leged injury is “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct” in order to 
have standing).  However, in Danforth, the Supreme Court found no issue with allowing 
physicians and family planning organizations to assert the rights of women seeking access 
to future, yet undeveloped, abortion procedures.  See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77–79 (1976).  This suggests that a physician or other third party 
could assert the rights of ill individuals to challenge laws restricting embryonic stem cell 
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ing individual and state interests at stake to determine whether to 
protect particular types of research.185  However, courts seem to have 
resolved these issues in favor of the individual by acknowledging that 
“scientific research is an essential stage in producing . . . medical 
treatments”186 and thus equally deserving of constitutional protection 
as a necessary precursor activity to the exercise of the therapeutic 
abortion right.187 
3.  The Case for Expanding the Scope of the Right to Therapeutic Medical 
Treatment 
While the Supreme Court has only formally recognized a right to 
therapeutic medical treatment in the abortion context, it is difficult 
to argue that the scope of the right should be so limited.  Indeed, if 
other therapeutic treatments are excluded from protection under the 
right to therapeutic medical treatment, then becoming pregnant is a 
prerequisite to the exercise of the right, implying that a pregnant 
woman’s interests in life and health are of greater value than those of 
other individuals, including the disabled and the terminally ill.  Al-
though it is arguable that women deserve special constitutional pro-
tection to the exclusion of others by virtue of being a subset of the 
general population susceptible to the risks of pregnancy,188 this line of 
 
research because such research may lead to the development of safe and effective thera-
pies. 
185 Carhart II’s preference for as-applied challenges can be read as imposing a causation re-
quirement.  See Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638 (2007) (suggesting that an as-applied 
challenge would be “the proper manner to protect the health of the woman if it c[ould] 
be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely 
to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used,” given that allega-
tions of speculative harm are disfavored). 
186 See Robertson, supra note 19, at 33–34. 
187 While Danforth and the Margaret S. cases date from the pre-Casey era in abortion jurispru-
dence, they are nevertheless still good law.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 881–84 (1992) (limiting Danforth with respect to its holding concerning the 
nontherapeutic right to abortion, not the therapeutic right to abortion).  Nevertheless, it 
is arguable that these cases are primarily focused on the health of the woman undergoing 
a present abortion, rather than the development of techniques for future abortions. 
188 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Unraveling the “Seamless Garment”:  Loose Threads in Pro-Life Pro-
gressivism, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 294, 299, 299–300 (2005) (contending that an overturn of 
Roe would perpetuate gender inequality); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Auton-
omy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (suggesting 
that Roe is weakened by “the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspec-
tive”); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 987 (1984) 
(arguing that constitutional evaluation of women’s reproductive rights should incorpo-
rate notions of sexual equality); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under 
Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1319 (1991) (“Because the social organization of reproduction is 
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reasoning proves too much because the same can be said with respect 
to cancer patients or other individuals subject to peculiar conditions 
that threaten their lives or their health.189  Regardless, the Court has 
expressed concern for individual interests in the preservation of life 
and health in several other medical care contexts, which could sug-
gest a willingness to expand the scope of the right to therapeutic 
medical treatment beyond abortion. 
The Court’s jurisprudence concerning end-of-life decisions is 
most instructive in this regard.  For starters, although Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health190 is generally known for suggesting 
that “competent” individuals have “a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,” including “lifesav-
ing hydration and nutrition,”191 it can be understood as implying that 
a constitutional right to receive such treatment might exist as well.  In 
justifying protection for the presumptive right to refuse medical 
treatment, the Court emphasized “[t]he choice between life and 
death [a]s a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming 
finality.”192  Yet, the Court ultimately held that the State of Missouri 
could constitutionally require a showing by clear and convincing evi-
dence that an individual in a persistent vegetative condition would 
not have wanted life-saving medical treatment before allowing her 
guardian to discontinue it, and that the substituted judgment of fam-
ily members will not suffice for withdrawal of treatment.193  This hold-
ing rested on the Court’s view that such procedural requirements “sa-
 
a major bulwark of women’s social inequality, any constitutional interpretation of a sex 
equality principle must prohibit laws, state policies, or official practices and acts that de-
prive women of reproductive control or punish women for their reproductive role or ca-
pacity.”); Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). 
189 Cf. Volokh, supra note 25, at 1826 (“Nothing about therapeutic postviability abortion 
makes it deserve protection more than any other medical self-defense proce-
dure. . . . Postviability abortions cannot be distinguished on the ground that they involve 
the woman’s reproductive choice.  After viability, the time for that choice has passed, and 
the right to get a therapeutic abortion is a consequence of the woman’s medical self-
defense right, not her abortion-as-choice right.”).  For a discussion of how “[l]ogic strong-
ly supports finding a right to medical treatments that save or extend life, since being alive 
is a necessary precondition to the exercise of other rights,” see Robertson, supra note 19, 
at 9–10. 
190 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
191 Id. at 278–79.  Although Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, did not explic-
itly say but rather “assumed” that such a right incorporates “the right to refuse lifesaving 
hydration and nutrition,” id. at 279, five Justices explicitly did say so in separate opinions.  
See id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (writing on 
behalf of Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens). 
192 Id. at 281 (majority opinion). 
193 Id. at 284, 286–87. 
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feguard the personal element” in an end-of-life decision and that fail-
ing to impose them could even offend due process, given that the in-
terests of a surrogate decisionmaker will not always coincide with 
those of the individual whose life is at stake.194  In the Court’s words:  
“It cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an inter-
est in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical 
treatment.”195  Thus, the implication is that permitting a State to im-
pose a mechanism that does not sufficiently protect an individual’s 
ability to receive life-saving medical treatment, if she so intends, 
would implicate her constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
life.196 
In addition, a right to palliative care that reduces extreme suffer-
ing, which the Court has intimated exists, would presumably incorpo-
rate a right to certain therapeutic treatments that serve the same 
purpose.  Even though the Court refused to recognize a right to phy-
sician-assisted suicide in Washington v. Glucksberg197 and its companion 
case Vacco v. Quill,198 scholars have argued that a majority of the Jus-
tices in Glucksberg nevertheless effectively recognized the existence of 
a right to palliative care, even when it hastens death, or at the least 
expressed a willingness to approve of such measures in appropriate 
circumstances.199  Typically, physicians administer palliative care to 
 
194 Id. at 281. 
195 Id. (emphasis added). 
196 Cf. Robertson, supra note 19, at 9–10, 12–13 (arguing that Cruzan supports recognition of 
a “negative due process right” to life, which can otherwise be understood as the “reverse 
of a right to end life”). 
197 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
198 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
199 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, § 10.5, at 854; Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks:  
Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234 
(1997); Yale Kamisar, Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence?:  Another Look at the End of Life 
and Personal Autonomy, 24 ISSUES L. & MED. 95, 101–08 (2008); Yale Kamisar, On the Mean-
ing and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 82 MINN. L. REV. 895, 908–09 (1998).  
Indeed, the majority in Glucksberg left open the question of whether the Constitution pro-
tects a physician’s assistance in aiding death in all circumstances, and its holding does not 
“foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doc-
tor whose assistance was sought, could prevail in a more particularized challenge.”  Gluck-
sberg, 521 U.S. at 735 n.24.  Justice O’Connor, writing on behalf of herself and Justice 
Ginsburg, emphasized that if “a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is 
experiencing great pain has . . . legal barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified 
physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and 
hastening death,” the constitutional question would be different.  Id. at 736–38 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  According to Justice 
Breyer: 
[T]he avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would have to 
constitute an essential part of any successful claim . . . . Were the legal circum-
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their patients in order to relieve them of pain arising from threats to 
their health, even though it may cause their health to deteriorate.200  
Alternatively, physicians administer therapeutic care as a curative 
measure to restore their patients’ health.201  But by restoring health, 
therapeutic care can and often does reduce pain, albeit indirectly, by 
striking at the source of the pain—the health threat—rather than the 
pain itself, as palliative care does.202  Therefore, it would be anoma-
lous for the Court to conclude that patients have a right to medical 
treatment that reduces suffering and hastens death, but do not have a 
right to medical treatment that reduces suffering and prolongs life,203 
especially in light of the Court’s recognition of constitutional protec-
tion for health and life interests in other therapeutic treatment con-
 
stances different—for example, were state law to prevent the provision of palliative 
care, including the administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of 
life—then the law’s impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable physical pain 
(accompanying death) would be more directly at issue . . . . [and] the Court might 
have to revisit its conclusions in these cases. 
  Id. at 791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring).  In Justice Stevens’s view, “there are situations in 
which an interest in hastening death is legitimate . . . . [and] there are times when it is 
entitled to constitutional protection,” particularly when terminally ill patients are “suffer-
ing constant and severe pain.”  Id. at 738–44 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Lastly,  Justice 
Souter said “[t]here can be no stronger claim to a physician’s assistance than at the time 
when death is imminent,” and such a claim may incorporate patients’ appeal for “not on-
ly an end to pain . . . but an end to their short remaining lives with a dignity that they be-
lieve[] would be denied them by powerful pain medication.”  Id. at 777–81 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
200 The main objective of palliative care, however, is not to cure or decrease an actual health 
threat, but rather to manage and decrease the pain arising from the threat.  See World 
Health Organization, WHO Definition of Palliative Care, http://www.who.int/cancer/
palliative/definition/en/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).  In fact, the nature and strength of 
many types of palliative care treatments, like analgesics such as morphine, may cause the 
health of patients to deteriorate and even hasten their death.  See Robertson, supra note 
19, at 10. 
201 Sometimes, however, the administration of therapeutic treatment for the purpose of re-
storing a patient’s health may actually cause the patient to endure a temporarily in-
creased level of pain, as is the case in chemotherapy for the treatment of cancer.  See Na-
tional Cancer Institute, Understanding Chemotherapy, http://www.cancer.gov/cancer
topics/chemo-side-effects/understandingchemo (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).  Therefore, 
physicians often administer both palliative care and therapeutic care in conjunction with 
one another to reap the gains of both while offsetting their downsides.  See World Health 
Organization, WHO’s Pain Ladder, http://www.who.int/cancer/palliative/painladder/
en/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).  Certain treatments, such as marijuana, also 
serve both therapeutic and pain-reducing purposes.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 
(2005). 
202 See supra notes 200–01. 
203 See Robertson, supra note 19, at 10 (arguing that “access to safe and effective ESC-derived 
therapies should be presumptively protected regardless of whether they saved life or only 
lessened pain and suffering, as many of them are likely to do”). 
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texts.  For this reason, the Court might even be more willing to pro-
tect access to therapeutic treatments that reduce pain than to protect 
access to palliative care treatments. 
Indeed, in justifying both protection for access to palliative care 
and non-recognition of a right to physician-assisted suicide, Justice 
Stevens, in his concurrence in Glucksberg, echoed the very principle at 
play in Cruzan—that inadequate protection by the State of an indi-
vidual’s ability to choose to live might offend due process.  Emphasiz-
ing the State’s “unqualified interest in the preservation of human 
life,”204 Justice Stevens explained: 
That interest not only justifies—it commands—maximum protection of every 
individual’s interest in remaining alive, which in turn commands the same 
protection for decisions about whether to commence or to terminate life-
support systems or to administer pain medication that may hasten death.  
Properly viewed, however, this interest is not a collective interest that 
should always outweigh the interests of a person who because of pain, in-
capacity, or sedation finds her life intolerable, but rather, an aspect of in-
dividual freedom.205 
This rationale implies that the value of a terminally ill patient’s inter-
est in the preservation of life not only coincides with the State’s inter-
est to the same end, but independently supports the imposition of a 
mechanism by the State—in this case, a law prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide—to ensure that the patient has full opportunity, free 
from interference such as “coercion or abuse” by others, to deter-
mine her own “quality of life” as it nears the end, whether that means 
remaining alive in pain or choosing to reduce it with medication.206 
In all of the contexts discussed above—therapeutic abortion, life-
sustaining treatment, and palliative care—the Court in part relied on 
a common rationale related to individual life and health interests to 
justify protecting access to the given treatment at issue:  that state ac-
tion implicated individual “bodily integrity.”207  Seth Kreimer has de-
scribed the concept of bodily integrity as “an extratextual constitu-
 
204 521 U.S. 702, 746 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)). 
205 Id. (emphases added).  The individual’s “interest in remaining alive” can thus be con-
strued either as a constitutional liberty interest or as a non-constitutional interest.  How-
ever, the former construction is more plausible, considering a State would presumably 
have no obligation to ensure that individuals are able to exercise the interest unless the 
Constitution mandated as much. 
206 See id. at 746–47 (noting that “[m]any terminally ill people find their lives meaningful 
even if filled with pain . . . . [or] find value in living through suffering”). 
207 See Seth F. Kreimer, Rejecting “Uncontrolled Authority over the Body”:  The Decencies of Civilized 
Conduct, the Past and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423 (2007). 
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tional doctrine of moral minimalism that denies the State—even in 
pursuit of legitimate public ends—‘uncontrolled authority over the 
bodies’ of those who are subject to its power.”208  According to Profes-
sor Kreimer: 
  When the Supreme Court revisited Roe v. Wade in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the plurality opinion of Justices 
O’Connor, Souter and Kennedy and the separate opinions of Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens invoked a right to “bodily integrity” enumerated 
in no clause of the Constitution.  That right had not underpinned prior 
reasoning in abortion cases, but as the prevailing Justices pointed out, it 
had blossomed elsewhere in the years between Roe and Casey.209 
However, adoption of this rationale was not limited to Justices who 
typically favored broader conceptions of “liberty.” 
  Every member of the Rehnquist Court, indeed, recognized extratex-
tual protections against physical violation by the state . . . . [and t]he first 
intimations of this détente came in Washington v. Glucksberg.  In address-
ing the claims for a right to assisted suicide, Justices Souter and Stevens 
reiterated their position that the Constitution provides protections for 
bodily integrity and the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.  Jus-
tices O’Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg suggested as well the possibility 
that “suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in ob-
taining relief from the suffering that they may experience in the last days 
of their lives,” though as interpreted the challenged statutes did not raise 
the issue.  More surprising, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself, 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas, acknowledged that: 
[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the 
‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical re-
straint.  The Clause also provides heightened protection against gov-
ernment interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty in-
terests.  In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the 
specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially 
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights . . . to bodily 
integrity and to abortion.  We have also assumed, and strongly sug-
gested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to 
refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.210 
What is at work here is the notion that a State is limited in what it can 
do with respect to individuals’ physical bodies, whether that means its 
constrained ability to force a woman to carry a pregnancy to term, to 
deny a vegetative individual life-saving treatment, or to force a patient 
to endure extreme pain without palliative care that is readily avail-
able.  Therefore, in light of the Court’s willingness to protect bodily 
 
208 Id. at 423. 
209 Id. at 423, 438–39 (citations omitted). 
210 Id. at 440–41 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
Apr. 2009] EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 1113 
 
integrity “under several doctrinal rubrics,”211 forcing individuals to 
suffer from threats to their life or health by restricting their access to 
other therapeutic treatments should, as a matter of doctrine, be no 
exception.212 
4.  Limitations Imposed by the State’s Power to Promote Public Health and 
Safety 
Despite doctrinal support for the argument that courts would be 
willing to expand the scope of constitutional protection for the right 
to therapeutic medical treatment beyond the abortion context, case 
law reveals that such expansion is not unlimited.  To be sure, begin-
ning with two Prohibition era cases decided by the Supreme Court 
which predate modern substantive due process jurisprudence, courts 
have relied on the power of the government to promote the public 
health and safety to refuse protection against state interference with 
access to unsafe or ineffective therapeutic treatments.  In James Ever-
ard’s Breweries v. Day,213 the Court unanimously rejected the argument 
that a federal law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of malt liq-
uors for medicinal purposes infringed on “the constitutional right of 
the patient to receive from the physician the prescription of malt liq-
uors [when] the physician deems it best for the health of his pa-
tient.”214  The Court upheld the law on the grounds that it was not “an 
arbitrary and unreasonable prohibition on the use of valuable me-
dicinal agents” and that it was within the judgment of Congress “as a 
matter affecting the public health” to prohibit the medicinal use of 
intoxicating malt liquors while allowing the medicinal use of other 
liquors.215  Similarly, in Lambert v. Yellowley,216 the Court rejected the 
argument that the same federal law’s limitation on the quantity of al-
cohol that physicians could prescribe infringed on “the right of the 
 
211 Id. at 423. 
212 Cf. Volokh, supra note 25, at 1826 (“Nor can one distinguish therapeutic abortions on the 
grounds that they involve control over the woman’s own body . . . . [because a] patient’s 
adding substances (such as medications or an organ) to her body, as well as her removing 
substances from her body (say, through medications that kill cancer cells), involves her 
control over her body as much as does a doctor’s inserting a surgical instrument to re-
move a fetus.”). 
213 265 U.S. 545 (1924). 
214 Id. at 553. 
215 Id. at 561–62 (deferring to Congress’s findings “that intoxicating malt liquors possessed 
no substantial and essential medicinal properties which made it necessary that their use 
for medicinal purposes should be permitted”). 
216 272 U.S. 581 (1926). 
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patient to receive the benefit of the judgment of the physician of his 
choice.”217  Even though the plaintiff-physician testified that in his 
judgment the use of alcohol in quantities higher than permitted were 
“necessary for the proper treatment of patients in order to afford re-
lief from human ailments,” the Court, relying on James Everard’s Brew-
eries, upheld the law as within Congress’s power to promote the pub-
lic health.218 
Although the abortion cases are the only instances in which the 
Court has decided challenges to laws restricting access to therapeutic 
treatment on substantive due process grounds since James Everard’s 
Breweries and Lambert,219 the Court has employed the public-health ra-
tionale to deny terminally ill patients access to therapeutic medical 
treatments in two relevant cases decided on statutory grounds.220  In 
United States v. Rutherford,221 the Supreme Court refused to read a 
medical necessity exception for terminally ill patients to access the 
unapproved cancer drug Laetrile into the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, which prohibited the marketing of drugs not recog-
nized as “safe” and “effective.”222  In justifying this conclusion, the 
Court emphasized the risks of reading an exception into the statute, 
including the drug’s potential for harm with no therapeutic benefit, 
especially among terminally ill patients who are most susceptible to 
negative effects from unapproved therapies; the possibility that the 
drug would be even more dangerous because forms of cancer react 
differently to certain therapies; the possibility of undermining the 
FDA’s authority for determining the safety and effectiveness of all 
drugs; and the potential exploitation of terminally ill individuals by 
 
217 Id. at 586. 
218 Id. at 588.  While Congress did not make any specific findings as to the medicinal value of 
particular quantities of alcohol, the Court nevertheless deferred to what it believed to be 
the congressional intent behind the law: 
[T]he limitation as to quantity must be taken as embodying an implicit congres-
sional finding that such liquors have no such medicinal value as gives rise to a 
need for larger or more frequent prescriptions.  Such a finding, in the presence of 
the well-known diverging opinions of physicians, cannot be regarded as arbitrary 
or without a reasonable basis. 
  Id. at 595. 
219 However, it should be noted that the Court has declined to address substantive due proc-
ess challenges to laws restricting access to therapeutic treatments in recent years.  See Hill, 
supra note 25, at 287–88 (noting that the plaintiffs in United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), raised 
the claim that they had a substantive due process right to use marijuana for therapeutic 
purposes, but that the Court did not address it in either case). 
220 Hill, supra note 25, at 302 (suggesting that these cases “fit the public-health model”). 
221 442 U.S. 544 (1979). 
222 Id. at 551. 
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entrepreneurs marketing ineffective therapies.223  In the end, the 
Court made clear that whether “an exemption should be created is a 
question for legislative judgment, not judicial inference.”224 
Similarly, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative,225 
the Court refused to read a medical necessity defense for terminally 
ill cancer patients into the federal Controlled Substances Act’s crimi-
nal prohibitions on the manufacturing and distribution of mari-
juana.226  Although there was evidence before the Court that mari-
juana could alleviate severe pain and wasting, and the district court 
found that “human suffering” could result from restricted access to 
the drug,227 the Court, relying in part on Rutherford,228 deferred to 
Congress’s judgment that marijuana was not an effective medicinal 
agent acceptable for public use: 
  Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is clear:  The 
defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has made a “determi-
nation of values.”  In the case of the Controlled Substances Act, the stat-
ute reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits wor-
thy of an exception (outside the confines of a Government-approved 
research project).  Whereas some other drugs can be dispensed and pre-
scribed for medical use, the same is not true for marijuana.  Indeed, for 
purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana has “no currently 
accepted medical use” at all.229 
However, Justice Stevens, in a concurrence, limited the holding by 
suggesting that “the defense might be available to a seriously ill pa-
tient for whom there is no alternative means of avoiding starvation or 
extraordinary suffering,” rather than to distributors of marijuana, as 
was the case here.230 
Two recent circuit court cases followed the public-health rationale 
to refuse recognition of substantive due process rights to modern 
therapeutic treatments.  In Raich v. Gonzales,231 on remand after the 
Supreme Court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the Con-
trolled Substances Act,232 the Ninth Circuit denied an as-applied chal-
lenge to the Act alleging that a cancer patient suffering from wasting 
 
223 Id. at 555–58. 
224 Id. at 559. 
225 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
226 Id. at 494. 
227 See id. at 487–88. 
228 See id. at 490. 
229 Id. at 491. 
230 Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
231 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007). 
232 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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disorder and severe pain had a fundamental right to marijuana for 
therapeutic use.233  Despite acknowledging the “medical and conven-
tional wisdom that recognizes the use of marijuana for medical pur-
poses is gaining traction in the law,” the court found “that legal rec-
ognition has not yet reached the point where a conclusion can be 
drawn that the right to use medical marijuana is ‘fundamental’ and 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”234  In reaching this con-
clusion, the court pointed to the existence of expansive prohibition 
of marijuana, even for therapeutic use, among the States and empha-
sized the traditional legislative power to combat perceived threats to 
the public health.235  However, in the end, the court made clear that 
recognition of the asserted right was not permanently foreclosed: 
For now, federal law is blind to the wisdom of a future day when the right 
to use medical marijuana to alleviate excruciating pain may be deemed 
fundamental.  Although that day has not yet dawned, considering that 
during the last ten years eleven states have legalized the use of medical 
marijuana, that day may be upon us sooner than expected.236 
Next, in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Es-
chenbach,237 the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc reversed a previous panel 
decision, which held unconstitutional the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act’s grant of sole authority to the FDA to approve drugs for public 
use, on the ground that it violated the right of terminally ill cancer 
patients to access investigational drugs that had qualified for human 
testing.238  The Alliance—a non-profit organization advocating greater 
access to experimental drug therapies on behalf of the terminally 
ill—argued, inter alia, that constitutional protection for therapeutic 
treatment in the abortion context extended to investigational 
drugs,239 but the court distinguished the therapeutic abortion right 
from the asserted right at bar: 
[T]his case is not about . . . access to life-saving medical treatment.  This 
case is about whether there is a constitutional right to assume, in the Al-
liance’s own words, “enormous risks,” in pursuit of potentially life-saving 
drugs.  Unlike the cases in which the doctrine of self-defense might 
properly be invoked, this case involves risk from drugs with no proven 
 
233 Raich, 500 F.3d at 866. 
234 Id. 
235 See id. at 864–66. 
236 Id. at 866. 
237 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).  For the va-
cated panel decision, see Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Experimental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
238 495 F.3d at 701. 
239 Id. at 709. 
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therapeutic effect, which at a minimum separates this example from the 
abortion “life of the mother” exception.240 
In ultimately upholding the Act, the court stressed the “historical tra-
dition of prohibiting the sale of unsafe drugs”241 and the legislature’s 
“well-established power to regulate in response to scientific, mathe-
matical, and medical advances.”242  Although the public-health ration-
ale foreclosed recognition of constitutional protection for therapeu-
tic treatment here, the court acknowledged the possibility of 
protecting therapeutic treatment in other contexts by stating:  “We 
do not address the broader question of whether access to medicine 
might ever implicate fundamental rights.”243 
These cases do not foreclose the possibility of extending the scope 
of the right to therapeutic medical treatment beyond the abortion 
context.  Rather, they can be understood as suggesting that constitu-
tional protection will not extend to other therapeutic treatments so 
long as they are unsafe or ineffective because they thus constitute 
threats to public safety and health.  In practice, this means that a par-
ticular therapeutic treatment will likely have to be approved by the 
FDA, the federal regulatory body responsible for approving new med-
ical treatments, before courts will protect individual access to it. 
However, it is unclear how the public-health rationale will play out 
in evaluating laws restricting embryonic stem cell research.  Although 
the district court in Margaret S. v. Treen and Judge Williams’s concur-
rence in Margaret S. v. Edwards suggested that protecting the public 
health is not a cognizable state interest in support of fetal experimen-
tation restrictions,244 the same cannot necessarily be said about restric-
tions on embryonic stem cell research because, unlike experimenta-
tion on fetal tissue, it may involve somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT).  SCNT is one of two techniques used to create human em-
bryos for therapeutic research, and there is concern that if left unre-
strained scientists may utilize it to engage in more abhorrent prac-
tices such as reproductive cloning and genetic engineering.  Whether 
a State’s interest in protecting against such abuses would persuade 
courts to deny constitutional protection to embryonic stem cell re-
search is too speculative an inquiry to pursue further.  However, even 
if it does not foreclose the possibility of constitutional protection as a 
 
240 Id. at 709–10. 
241 See id. at 703–07. 
242 Id. at 706. 
243 Id. at 701. 
244 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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general matter, courts still might find that certain restrictions on em-
bryonic stem cell research are sufficiently tailored to further this in-
terest and thus outweigh any burden they impose on the right to the-
rapeutic treatment. 
Yet, despite these hypothetical doctrinal constraints, a constitu-
tional attack on laws restricting embryonic stem cell research presents 
an altogether different challenge than those raised in the public 
health cases described above.  Indeed, a challenge to laws restricting 
embryonic stem cell research does not seek access to the use of actual 
therapies, given that none currently exist, but rather protection 
against state interference with the prior research necessary to develop 
them.  As such, the public health cases may very well be inapplicable 
in the research context given that access to potentially harmful or in-
effective therapies is not even at issue. 
III.  EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS RESTRICTING 
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 
Assuming that the Due Process Clause protects against state inter-
ference with embryonic stem cell research, as argued in Part II, there 
is then a question of the appropriate standard of review to evaluate 
the constitutionality of laws restricting this research.  To this end, the 
standards of review the Supreme Court has used to analyze laws im-
plicating the therapeutic abortion right are most instructive.  For 
one, the Court has thus far only recognized a right to therapeutic 
medical treatment in its abortion jurisprudence.  More importantly, 
however, the abortion cases have provided the Court with numerous 
opportunities to evaluate the competing individual and state interests 
at stake in laws restricting access to therapeutic medical treatment 
and arrive at a standard of review that strikes an appropriate balance 
between them.  Therefore, given the lack of alternatives, it is reason-
able to presume that a court would invoke a standard derived from 
cases involving the therapeutic abortion right if presented with a sub-
stantive due process challenge to a law restricting embryonic stem 
cell research. 
Until its most recent abortion decision, Carhart II,245 the Supreme 
Court had subjected laws allegedly lacking an adequate health excep-
tion to such an exacting scrutiny—under which the government bore 
the burden of demonstrating that the law in question would never 
 
245 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
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threaten a woman’s health—that its application was almost always fa-
tal.246  However, in Carhart II, the Court “analyzed the need for a 
health exception under the ‘undue burden’ rubric . . . in which the 
burden is on the challenger to show that the abortion regulation puts 
a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions.”247 Al-
though the undue burden standard is a form of heightened scru-
tiny,248 it is a less rigid standard of review that differs in material re-
spects from exacting scrutiny.249  Yet, Carhart II arguably did not 
modify the application of the stricter standard of review that the 
Court has traditionally used in determining the need for a life excep-
tion because the Court found it unnecessary to address the issue.250 
Therefore, following the Court’s abortion jurisprudence for guid-
ance, there are two different standards that might be applicable in 
 
246 See Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000) (invalidating a law prohibiting a particular partial-
birth abortion procedure because the State could not prove that it was never “necessary, 
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother” 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992))); Thorn-
burgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 770–71 (1986) (in-
validating a law requiring the presence of two physicians when performing late-term abor-
tions on potentially viable fetuses because it was not “worded sufficiently to imply an 
emergency exception . . . [and] contain[ed] no such comforting or helpful language and 
evince[d] no intent to protect a woman whose life may be at risk”); City of Akron v. Ak-
ron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 437 (1983) (invalidating a law requiring sec-
ond trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital in part because there was “impres-
sive evidence that—at least during the early weeks of the second trimester—[certain] 
abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital”); 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1978) (invalidating on vagueness grounds a law 
requiring physicians, when performing abortions, to use the procedure with the best 
chance of preserving the life of the fetus, given that the law “d[id] not clearly spec-
ify . . . that the woman’s life and health must always prevail over the fetus’s life and health 
when they conflict” because the government may not “requir[e] the physician to make a 
‘trade-off’ between the woman’s health and additional percentage points of fetal sur-
vival”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78–79 (1976) (invali-
dating a law prohibiting amniocentesis, one of the most common abortion procedures 
nationwide, in part because it was “safer, with respect to maternal mortality, than even 
continuation of the pregnancy until normal childbirth”); cf. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of 
Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 485 n.8 (1982) (employing an avoidance canon to 
construe a law requiring the presence of two physicians during the performance of abor-
tions subsequent to viability to apply to “emergency situations where, for example, the 
woman’s health may be endangered by delay”). 
247 Hill, supra note 25, at 322. 
248 See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 4, Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-380) (“[T]he undue burden test 
is not a form of intermediate scrutiny.  Rather, notwithstanding this Court’s recognition 
that governments possess powerful, compelling interests in regulating abortion, the un-
due burden test remains a form of strict scrutiny.”). 
249 See Hill, supra note 25, at 322. 
250 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1639. 
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analyzing the constitutionality of laws restricting embryonic stem cell 
research:  The undue burden standard and a more exacting form of 
scrutiny.  Given that prospective therapies derived from embryonic 
stem cells are believed to both combat significant risks to individuals’ 
health and treat life-threatening illnesses, it is uncertain which stan-
dard of review might be more appropriate.  Although laws restricting 
embryonic stem cell research would be subject to more searching re-
view under exacting scrutiny, there is a strong indication that they 
would fail to pass constitutional muster within the undue burden 
standard as well. 
A.  The Adoption of the Undue Burden Standard in Assessing the Need for a 
Health Exception in Laws Implicating the Therapeutic Abortion Right 
Stenberg v. Carhart (“Carhart I”),251 the Supreme Court’s first partial-
birth abortion case, epitomized the exacting scrutiny the Court had 
applied to laws lacking an adequate health exception before Carhart 
II.  In Carhart I, the Court invalidated a Nebraska statute that it inter-
preted to proscribe the performance of two partial-birth-abortion 
procedures before viability—the prevalent dilation-and-evacuation 
procedure (“D&E”) and the controversial dilation-and-extraction 
procedure (“D&X”)—partly on the ground that the statute did not 
include an exception for the preservation of the mother’s health.252  
The Court held that such an exception was not required if the State 
could prove that the prohibited procedure was never “necessary, in 
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or 
health of the mother.”253  “[B]ecause the record show[ed] that sig-
nificant medical authority supports the proposition that in some cir-
cumstances, D&X would be the safest procedure,” the State did not 
meet its burden of proof.254 
Significantly, the Court in Carhart I did not consider Nebraska’s 
state interests in support of the statute in its analysis.  According to 
the Court, the State’s interests did not “make any difference to the 
question at hand, namely, the application of the ‘health’ require-
ment.”255  That the Court was willing to strike down the statute for the 
mere possibility that some women might require the procedure in 
 
251 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
252 Id. at 930. 
253 Id. at 938 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)). 
254 Id. at 932. 
255 Id. at 931. 
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“certain circumstances”256 suggests that the Court believed the indi-
vidual health interests implicated by the statute carried enough 
weight to entirely subjugate the asserted state interests and make ir-
relevant the possibility that the health exception would be unneces-
sary in practice.  In light of the Court’s analysis in Carhart I, some 
lower courts and commentators considered the health exception a 
virtual per se constitutional requirement.257 
However, in Carhart II, the Court changed course by applying the 
less demanding undue burden standard rather than the exacting 
scrutiny it previously applied to uphold the federal Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act of 2003, which prohibited the D&X procedure, even 
though it did not include a health exception.258  Reiterating the in-
quiry in Stenberg, the Court examined whether the prohibited D&X 
procedure was ever necessary, in professional medical judgment, to 
protect a woman’s health.259  As in Carhart I, the Court found that 
there was uncertainty in the medical community on this point, based 
on evidence presented by the parties.260  However, unlike the Ne-
braska legislature in Carhart I, Congress had made specific findings 
that the D&X procedure was never necessary to preserve a woman’s 
health.261  According to the Court, the existence of “medical uncer-
tainty over whether the Act’s prohibition creates significant health 
risks provide[d] a sufficient basis to conclude . . .  that the Act does 
not impose an undue burden.”262  Although the Court did not explic-
 
256 Id. at 937. 
257 See, e.g., KOROBKIN & MUNZER, supra note 24, at 81 (explaining that “the law is clear that 
the government may not interfere, under any circumstances, with a woman’s attempt to ob-
tain an abortion when doing so is necessary to protect her health” (emphasis added)); 
Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing 
this treatment by other circuit courts).  In Casey, the plurality employed an avoidance ca-
non to construe a “medical emergency” exception that pertained to a spousal consent 
provision, a twenty-four-hour waiting period provision, and a reporting-and-recording re-
quirement in a Pennsylvania abortion statute in such a manner that they “would not in 
any way pose a significant threat to the life or health of a woman.”  Casey, 505 U.S. at 879–
80 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991)).  How-
ever, in noting that the exception would be constitutionally inadequate if it “foreclose[d] 
the possibility of an immediate abortion despite some significant health risks,” id. at 880, 
the plurality indicated that exacting scrutiny would apply. 
258 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1631–40 (2007); see also Hill, supra note 25, at 322 (stating that 
the Court in Carhart II “analyzed the need for a health exception under the ‘undue bur-
den’ rubric, rather than treating it as a separate and independent constitutional re-
quirement”). 
259 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1631. 
260 Id. at 1631–33. 
261 Id. at 1635. 
262 Id. at 1637. 
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itly overrule Carhart I by deferring to the legislature instead of the 
plaintiff when confronted with a constitutional question that turned 
on a legislative fact surrounded by scientific uncertainty, the inescap-
able implication is that it did. 
Additionally, although the existence of scientific uncertainty was a 
“sufficient basis” for deferring to Congress, the Court in Carhart II 
explained that the availability of safer adequate alternatives to the 
prohibited procedure also supported its conclusion that a health ex-
ception was unnecessary.263  Since the Act proscribed only D&X, a 
pregnant woman could still obtain the more common D&E proce-
dure, which was “generally the safest method of abortion during the 
second trimester,” in the event she should need a therapeutic abor-
tion.264  That D&E might have carried some risk did not foreclose up-
holding the Act:  “When standard medical options are available, mere 
convenience does not suffice to displace them; and if some proce-
dures have different risks than others, it does not follow that the State 
is altogether barred from imposing reasonable regulations.”265  What 
the Court meant by “reasonable regulations” is not entirely clear, but 
the implication is that regulations are reasonable insofar as they per-
mit access to adequately safe alternative treatments to protect the 
health of the mother; otherwise, the regulations would unduly bur-
den a woman’s right to a therapeutic abortion. 
Notably, while the Court in Carhart II affirmed that the health ex-
ception was a constraint on the government’s ability to regulate abor-
tion, it rejected Carhart I’s contention that governmental interests in 
support of a law prohibiting a particular abortion procedure do not 
bear on the issue of whether a health exception is required.  Indeed, 
unlike in Carhart I, the Court emphasized the State’s interests in “re-
gulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life” 
in justifying the prohibition on the D&X procedure.266  Therefore, 
the Court’s adoption of the undue burden standard in Carhart II can 
be understood as a reevaluation of the weight it had previously ac-
corded the individual health interests and the state interests at stake 
in laws implicating the therapeutic abortion right to arrive at a more 
appropriate balance, where health interests do not necessarily trump 
state interests. 
 
263 Id. 
264 Id. (quoting Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1031 (D. Neb. 2004)). 
265 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638 (2007). 
266 Id. at 1633. 
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It is not entirely clear how, if at all, the undue burden standard 
the Carhart II Court used to evaluate the necessity of a health excep-
tion differs from the undue burden standard the Casey plurality ar-
ticulated to govern laws burdening the nontherapeutic abortion 
right.  In Casey, the plurality dispensed with Roe’s trimester framework 
and the use of strict scrutiny in evaluating laws implicating the right 
to nontherapeutic abortion, and held that the undue burden stan-
dard should be applied to such laws instead because “the undue bur-
den standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s in-
terest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”267  
According to the plurality, a law constitutes an undue burden to the 
nontherapeutic abortion right if it “has the purpose or effect of plac-
ing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion” prior to viability.268  Acknowledging the government’s “profound 
interest in potential life,” the plurality held that “throughout preg-
nancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice 
is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not 
be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to 
choose childbirth over abortion.”269  In applying this formulation to 
the Pennsylvania statute at issue, the plurality upheld a twenty-four-
hour waiting period provision and a reporting-and-recording re-
quirement, but struck down a spousal consent requirement because it 
was “likely to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining 
an abortion,” whereas the other provisions were not likely to do any 
such thing.270  As such, the plurality “seem[ed] . . . to be saying that an 
undue burden exists only if there is a showing that the regulation will 
keep someone from getting an abortion,”271 which would be consis-
 
267 505 U.S. at 876–77. 
268 Id. at 877. 
269 Id. at 878. 
270 Id. at 879–901. 
271 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, § 10.3.3.1, at 830.  Following this rationale, the Court in 
Carhart I invalidated the Nebraska partial-birth-abortion statute, in part, on the ground 
that it “‘impose[d] an undue burden on a woman’s ability’ to choose a D&E abortion, 
thereby unduly burdening the right to choose abortion itself.”  Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 
930 (2000) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874).  According to the Court, the statute’s reach 
was what ultimately doomed it under this theory, given that it proscribed D&E—“the 
most commonly used method for performing previability second trimester abortions”—
even though it aimed only to proscribe D&X.  Id. at 945.  However, in Carhart II, 127 S. 
Ct. at 1628–31, the Court distinguished Carhart I and upheld a similar proscription in the 
Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 on the ground the statute only prohibited 
the performance of D&X, and not D&E. 
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tent with Carhart II’s application of the undue burden standard to de-
termine the necessity of a health exception. 
However, the Casey plurality also suggested that a law’s purpose, 
and not just its effect, is relevant to determine whether a particular 
abortion regulation constitutes an undue burden.272  Although nei-
ther the plurality in Casey nor the Court in Carhart II examined the 
laws sub judice for evidence of an improper purpose, it is reasonable 
to conclude that a law which has the purpose of creating a substantial 
obstacle to obtaining an abortion, nontherapeutic or therapeutic, 
would constitute an undue burden and thus be unconstitutional. 
B.  The Application of the Undue Burden Standard to Laws Restricting 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that several factors should 
be considered when analyzing laws restricting embryonic stem cell re-
search within the undue burden standard.  These factors include:  
whether there is uncertainty as to the need for embryonic stem cell 
research to combat significant health risks; whether adequate alterna-
tive therapies or research that would obviate the need for embryonic 
stem cell research are available; whether laws restricting embryonic 
stem cell research have the purpose of placing a substantial obstacle 
in path of individuals seeking therapeutic medical treatment; and 
whether balancing the state interests in support of laws restricting 
embryonic stem cell research outweigh the individual interests in the 
preservation of life and health at stake. 
1.  Scientific Uncertainty as to the Therapeutic Need for Embryonic Stem 
Cell Research 
In Carhart II, the Court justified upholding the Partial Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act of 2003 on the ground that the existence of uncertainty 
within the medical community as to whether the D&X procedure 
constituted an undue burden on the therapeutic abortion right man-
dated deference to Congressional findings that indicated the proce-
dure was never necessary to protect women’s health.  In light of “do-
cumented medical disagreement” presented by the parties, the Court 
explained: 
 
272 See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed:  The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitu-
tional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 927 (1994) (explaining that Casey adopted a “com-
plex standard that examines a challenged law’s purpose as well as its effect”). 
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[S]tate and federal legislatures [have] wide discretion to pass legislation 
in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty. . . . Medical 
uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the 
abortion context any more than it does in other contexts.  The medical 
uncertainty over whether the Act’s prohibition creates significant health 
risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that the Act 
does not impose an undue burden.273 
Although the Court went on to explain that “[t]he conclusion that 
the Act does not impose an undue burden is supported by other con-
siderations,”274 the Court’s plain language makes clear that the exis-
tence of uncertainty alone was “sufficient” to uphold the Act within 
the undue burden standard. 
While Carhart II’s application of this so-called “traditional rule”275 
suggests that the existence of uncertainty as to the therapeutic bene-
fits of therapies derived from embryonic stem cell research would 
command upholding laws restricting this research, it is unclear how 
to determine whether such uncertainty actually exists.  Given that no 
effective therapies have been derived from embryonic stem cell re-
search as of yet, there is inherent uncertainty as to whether prospec-
tive treatments will someday prove therapeutic.  However, the scien-
tific community is in substantial agreement that embryonic stem cells 
are necessary for the development of effective therapies for a variety 
of currently incurable conditions.276  Therefore, the ultimate effect of 
the “traditional rule” on laws restricting embryonic stem cell research 
depends on how a court should choose to determine whether uncer-
tainty within the meaning of the rule exists.  If the inherently uncer-
tain nature of embryonic stem cell research is the appropriate deter-
minant, then the rule would mandate upholding a law restricting this 
research.  On the other hand, if the medical consensus as to the need 
for prospective treatments derived from embryonic stem cell research 
is the appropriate determinant, then the rule probably would not 
mandate legislative deference. 
Despite this dichotomy, there are several strong arguments that 
the latter is the appropriate determinant, and that the mere existence 
of inherent uncertainty in embryonic stem cell research should not 
automatically warrant upholding laws restricting it.  For one, the 
Court in Carhart II specifically addressed a conflict of medical opinion 
 
273 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1636–37 (emphasis added). 
274 Id. at 1637. 
275 Id. at 1618. 
276 See MOONEY, supra note 3, at 195–216 (rejecting claims by minority of scientists that em-
bryonic stem cell research is unnecessary in this regard). 
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over the therapeutic necessity of the D&X procedure, not the inher-
ent uncertainty of ever knowing that the procedure would be neces-
sary to preserve women’s health.  To be sure, it is impossible to know 
if any therapeutic treatment, whether it currently exists or is in devel-
opment, will be safe and effective in combating health risks in certain 
circumstances in the future.  Therefore, given that there is some de-
gree of inherent uncertainty always present in therapeutic medical 
science, a rule that turns on the existence of inherent uncertainty 
would be meaningless because it would always mandate legislative de-
ference.  Furthermore, it is arguable that the rule mandating legisla-
tive deference in the face of medical uncertainty does not apply 
where the legislative body responsible for enacting the law at issue is 
“an entirely separate sovereign,” namely a state legislature as in Car-
hart I, opposed to Congress as in Carhart II.277  Accordingly, federal 
courts hearing challenges to laws restricting embryonic stem cell re-
search, all of which are state laws, would not have to apply the tradi-
tional rule simply because they were enacted by state legislatures, op-
posed to Congress.  Last, the application of the traditional rule in 
Carhart II and not in Carhart I can be justified on the bases that Con-
gress made specific findings as to the therapeutic necessity of the 
D&X procedure, whereas the Nebraska legislature did not.278  As such, 
absent findings by the state legislatures responsible for enacting re-
strictions on embryonic stem cell research that this research would 
not lead to the development of therapeutic treatments, the tradi-
tional rule should not foreclose the possibility that laws restricting 
embryonic stem cell research constitute an undue burden to the right 
to therapeutic medical treatment. 
2.  The Availability of Adequate Alternatives to Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research and Prospective Treatments Derived Therefrom 
In Carhart II, the Court said that the availability of the D&E pro-
cedure, an adequately safe and effective alternative to the D&X pro-
cedure, supported its conclusion that the Partial Birth Abortion Ban 
Act of 2003 constituted an undue burden to the therapeutic abortion 
 
277 See Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he factual findings that cast doubt on the safety implications of D&X . . . were made 
by the legislative body of an entirely separate sovereign, suggesting the possibility that they 
could be of diminished relevance here.” (emphasis added)). 
278 See Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. 
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right for lack of a health exception.279  The Court based its determina-
tion that the D&E procedure was an adequately safe and effective al-
ternative on the grounds that it carried “extremely low rates of medi-
cal complications,” was “generally the safest method of abortion 
during the second trimester,” and could be performed under the Act 
if “truly necessary” to preserve women’s health.280 
According to this logic, the availability of adequate alternative 
forms of therapeutic experimentation to embryonic stem cell re-
search or the existence of adequately safe and effective therapeutic 
treatments for conditions that prospective therapies derived from 
embryonic stem cells could potentially treat weigh against invaliding 
laws restricting embryonic stem cell research.281  However, scientists 
believe that embryonic stem cell research will lead to the develop-
ment of various therapies to treat degenerative conditions, such as 
such as Parkinson’s Disease, leukemia, diabetes, heart disease, and 
spinal cord injury, for which there are no superior treatments—
certainly none that could ultimately provide cures for these condi-
tions—currently in existence.282  Moreover, although some in the 
medical community believe that alternative therapeutic research me-
thods that do not involve the destruction of embryos could provide 
treatments on par with those that embryonic stem cell research is be-
lieved to deliver, there is overwhelming medical authority to the con-
trary.283  That said, it is difficult to argue that existing alternatives to 
embryonic stem cell research and prospective therapies derived the-
refrom are adequate substitutes to protect the health interests of in-
dividuals suffering from degenerative conditions.  Indeed, this posi-
tion has been “resoundingly rejected by researchers actually working 
 
279 Id. at 1637. 
280 Id. (quoting Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1031 (2004)). 
281 It may not even be necessary to consider this factor in an analysis of laws restricting em-
bryonic stem cell research, given that Carhart II may only apply to laws prohibiting certain 
abortion procedures, and not every type abortion regulation.  See Planned Parenthood of 
Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 948 (2005) (in-
validating parental consent statute for lack of an adequate health exception); Planned 
Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(invalidating parental notification and waiting period requirements for lack of health ex-
ceptions); cf. Planned Parenthood of Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 
2006) (en banc) (requiring health exception in state law prohibiting off-label use of abor-
tion-inducing drug RU-486).  If this is the case, then Carhart II should not apply to restric-
tions on research, even though it may apply to prohibitions on treatments derived from 
embryonic stem cell research. 
282 See Yu & Thomson, supra note 4, at 1–8. 
283 See MOONEY, supra note 3, at 195–216.  Reprogramming has yet to become an adequate 
alternative substitute for embryonic stem cell research.  See discussion supra Part I. 
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in the field.”284  Therefore, consideration of this matter weighs in fa-
vor of finding that laws restricting embryonic stem cell research con-
stitute undue burdens to the right to therapeutic medical treatment. 
3.  The Purpose of Creating a Substantial Obstacle to Individuals’ Access 
to Therapeutic Medical Treatment 
Casey suggests that if a law “has the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion,” it 
constitutes an undue burden.285  Accordingly, if a law restricting em-
bryonic stem cell research has the purpose of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of individuals seeking therapeutic medical treat-
ment, it should similarly constitute an undue burden. 
While laws restricting embryonic stem cell research unquestiona-
bly have the purpose of preventing the development of therapies de-
rived from the destruction of human embryos, it would probably be 
unreasonable to conclude that they intend to deprive individuals of 
therapeutic treatment in general.  Indeed, supporters of these laws 
typically claim that embryonic stem cell research is unnecessary to 
develop therapies to treat individuals with degenerative conditions; 
they just disagree with proponents of embryonic stem cell research 
about the means of attaining this objective.  Considering in the abor-
tion context a law that “has the incidental effect of making it more 
difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough 
to invalidate it,”286 even though “[e]very law adopted to limit abortion 
is for the purpose of discouraging abortions and encouraging child-
birth,”287 it is unlikely that a law restricting embryonic stem cell re-
search would constitute an undue burden on account of an unconsti-
tutional purpose. 
4.  Balancing Competing State and Individual Interests at Stake in Laws 
Restricting Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
A distinction of the undue burden standard is that it necessarily 
entails the balancing of competing state and individual interests at 
stake.  The Court has specified several cognizable state interests in 
support of abortion regulations:  protecting fetal life and respect for 
 
284 Id. at 196. 
285 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
286 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1633 (2007) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874). 
287 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, § 10.3.3.1, at 830. 
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it, promoting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, and 
promoting women’s health.288  Indeed, in applying the undue burden 
standard in Carhart II, the Court emphasized these latter two interests 
in upholding the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 without a 
health exception.  According to the Court: 
There can be no doubt the government has an interest in protecting 
the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.  Under our precedents 
it is clear the State has a significant role to play in regulating the medical 
profession. . . . 
. . . The government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to 
show its profound respect for the life within the woman. . . . [T]hat the 
State, from the inception of the pregnancy, maintains its own regulatory 
interest in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child, can-
not be set at naught by interpreting Casey’s requirement of a health ex-
ception so it becomes tantamount to allowing a doctor to choose the 
abortion method he or she might prefer.  Where it has a rational basis to 
act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regu-
latory power to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in fur-
therance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in 
order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.289 
Considering the outcome of a balancing test turns on the specific 
facts and laws involved in a given case, there is ultimately no telling if 
courts would find that the state interests in support of laws restricting 
embryonic stem cell research trump the individual interests in the 
preservation of life and health at stake, as in Carhart II. 
However, there is good reason to believe that the outcome of a ba-
lancing test would favor the individual interests in the preservation of 
life and health.  While the state interests in support of laws restricting 
embryonic stem cell research include some of those interests in sup-
port of abortion regulations—promoting the ethics and integrity in 
the medical profession and respect for human life290—it is arguable 
that the result of a challenge to a law restricting embryonic stem cell 
research should be the same as that reached in Carhart II.  But this 
overlooks the fact that the State’s interest in promoting respect for 
human life is much weaker in the research context than in the abor-
tion context.  For one, “[w]ith therapeutic cloning, there is no inten-
tion of bringing the embryo to term[,] . . . [given that its] stem cells 
are removed for research, with the hope that this research will con-
tribute to progress in the development of treatments for individu-
 
288 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972). 
289 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1633. 
290 See Robertson, supra note 19, at 16 (describing state interests in support of regulations on 
hypothetical therapies derived from embryonic stem cells). 
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als.”291  Furthermore, the fact that the disposal of spare embryos oc-
curs in a variety of widely accepted fertilization practices, even in 
States that restrict embryonic stem cell research, cuts against the ar-
gument that embryos should be accorded the same respect as a po-
tentially viable fetus.292  Therefore, the scale should tip in favor of 
protecting embryonic stem cell research. 
Yet, there is another state interest unique to restrictions on em-
bryonic stem cell research that might influence the balancing test:  
preventing “a slide down a slippery slope toward more abusive or re-
pugnant practices, such as reproductive cloning and genetic engi-
neering of offspring.”293  Although “[t]he speculative fear that some 
unknown amount of reproductive cloning might occur if we allow 
cloning for research or therapy is hardly a sufficient basis for denying 
persons the present ability to use safe and effective [embryonic-stem-
cell-derived] treatments,” as Professor Robertson has argued,294 the 
same cannot necessarily be the said about the research that leads to 
the development of those treatments.  Yet, although “[s]lippery slope 
appeals may rationally serve present values[,] . . . they do so at a cost 
in both present and future interests.”295  According to Professor Ro-
bertson, accounting for the value of this cost leads to the conclusion 
that “the fear of a slippery slope to reproductive cloning provides nei-
ther a compelling nor even a substantial basis for denying people safe 
and effective [embryonic stem cell] treatments.”296  However, even if a 
court would find the slippery slope argument cognizable in support 
of a restriction on embryonic stem cell research, the law would likely 
be overbroad or insufficiently tailored to the State’s objective.  To be 
sure, as Steve Goldberg has suggested:  “It is no great feat to write leg-
islation that bans reproductive cloning while allowing therapeutic 
cloning; indeed, some States have passed laws that do just that.  If our 
society remains committed to prohibiting reproductive cloning, it can 
prohibit it without stamping out therapeutic cloning as well.”297  In 
this light, given the lack of available alternatives to embryonic stem 
cell research and the therapies derived from it, the state interests in 
support of laws restricting this research seem considerably weaker 
 
291 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 307. 
292 See id. at 311–13. 
293 Robertson, supra note 19, at 16. 
294 Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
295 Id. at 29. 
296 Id. at 30. 
297 Goldberg, supra note 25, at 311. 
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than the individual interests implicated by them, thus supporting the 
contention that such laws unduly burden the right to therapeutic 
medical treatment. 
C.  The Survival of Exacting Scrutiny in Assessing the Need for a Life 
Exception in Laws Implicating the Therapeutic Abortion Right 
In Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox,298 handed down by 
the Sixth Circuit a few months after Carhart II, the court observed, “it 
is not apparent how and whether [Carhart II] diminishes the rule re-
quiring an exception to protect the woman’s life that does not im-
pose upon her an increased medical risk,” considering the life excep-
tion went unchallenged in Carhart II.299 However, the court concluded 
that Carhart II “suggests that the Supreme Court’s precedent pertain-
ing to the life exception remains unchanged.”300 
The Supreme Court’s traditional application of exacting scrutiny 
in analyzing the need for a life exception derives from Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.301  In Thornburgh, the 
Court invalidated a Pennsylvania statute requiring physicians, in any 
post-viability abortion, to use the procedure that would provide the 
best opportunity for the fetus to be born alive unless the procedure 
would pose “a significantly greater medical risk to the life or health of 
the pregnant woman.”302  According to the Court, the statute’s life ex-
ception provided inadequate protection because it required the 
“mother to bear an increased medical risk in order to save her viable 
fetus,” and was thus unconstitutional.303 
Carhart II did not consider the applicability of the Thornburgh rule 
“requiring an exception to protect the woman’s life that does not im-
pose upon her an increased medical risk” because the Partial-Birth 
 
298 487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 873 (2008) (invalidating a Michigan 
law that prohibited the D&E procedure on the ground that the law posed an undue bur-
den on women’s nontherapeutic abortion right, and refusing to decide whether the law 
was also invalid for lack of an adequate life exception). 
299 Id. at 340 (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 769 (1986), which rejected a “‘trade-off’ between the woman’s health and additional 
percentage points of fetal survival”). 
300 Id. 
301 476 U.S. 747. 
302 Id. at 768 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3210(b) (2000)). 
303 Id. at 769 (quoting Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Pa. Section v. Thorn-
burgh, 737 F.2d 283, 300 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
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Abortion Act of 2003 already included an adequate life exception.304  
However, the Carhart II Court did note that “[n]o as-applied chal-
lenge need be brought if the prohibition in the Act threatens a wom-
an’s life”305 because the Act specified that its prohibition “does not 
apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a 
mother.”306  Given the limited opportunities the Court has had to eva-
luate abortion regulations lacking life exceptions, it is not apparent 
how the government could overcome a challenge to such a regula-
tion.  Under current law, however, suffice it to say that an abortion 
regulation that does not provide an exception where necessary to 
save the life of the mother is presumably invalid, despite Carhart II.307 
D.  The Application of Exacting Scrutiny to Laws Restricting Embryonic Stem 
Cell Research 
Subject to the exacting scrutiny of the life exception, embryonic 
stem cell research restrictions could only pass constitutional muster if 
a State could show that existing therapies do not impose upon indi-
viduals with life-threatening illnesses an increased risk that they 
would otherwise not be exposed to if the restrictions were lifted.  Giv-
en that the medical community generally believes therapies derived 
from embryonic stem cells could be used to combat life-threatening 
degenerative conditions,308 preventing the development of these ther-
apies inherently increases the medical risks to which individuals with 
these conditions are exposed.  Indeed, the longer laws restricting 
embryonic stem cell research remain in place, the longer the devel-
opment of potential therapies is stalled, which in turn subjects indi-
viduals with degenerative conditions to medical risks associated with 
those conditions for a longer period of time.  Therefore, application 
of the Thornburgh rule should warrant striking down laws restricting 
embryonic stem cell research without question. 
 
304 Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 339–40 (6th Cir. 2007) (in-
dicating that the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 included a life exception 
that went unchallenged in Carhart II). 
305 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007). 
306 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2003). 
307 See Cox, 487 F.3d at 339–40. 
308 See MOONEY, supra note 3, at 195–216. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Comment is to propose a framework for chal-
lenging laws restricting embryonic research.  This Comment does not 
attempt to reach a definitive conclusion as to the constitutionality of 
particular restrictions, considering such a determination largely de-
pends on the circumstances of a given case.  Yet, the foregoing 
framework indicates that those laws which directly prohibit the tech-
niques necessary to perform embryonic stem cell research, such as 
somatic cell nuclear transfer or in vitro fertilization, are most suscep-
tible to successful constitutional attack, whereas funding restrictions 
and other laws that incidentally burden the performance of this re-
search are least susceptible. 
While there is substantial support to challenge restrictions of em-
bryonic stem cell research, prospective challengers must be wary of 
the doctrinal and ideological limitations they might confront should 
they decide to bring such an action.  Over the years, courts have 
tended to shy away from finding new substantive due process rights 
or expanding the scope of constitutional protection for those already 
recognized.309  The Supreme Court’s abortion cases, in particular, 
constitute “perhaps the most controversial line of decisions in mod-
ern constitutional history.”310  As such, it is arguable that invoking 
them is “not a promising point of departure to establish a more gen-
eral right.”311  While certain courts may not be so inclined to entertain 
a theory proposing a broader right to therapeutic medical treatment, 
the Supreme Court continues to recognize new fundamental rights 
under substantive due process and relies on prior precedent, includ-
ing its abortion jurisprudence, to justify such protection.312 
 
309 See Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance:  Substantive Due Process Since Law-
rence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 411 (2006) (finding that even after Lawrence a ma-
jority of lower courts still adopt the restrictive test for finding fundamental rights set 
down in Glucksberg, despite Lawrence’s broad view of substantive due process). 
310 O. Carter Snead, Unenumerated Rights and the Limits of an Analogy:  A Critique of the Right to 
Medical Self-Defense, 121 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (May 2007), http://www.harvard
lawreview.org/forum/issues/120/may07/snead.pdf. 
311 Id.  To be sure, according to the cynical observer, the status of therapeutic abortion as a 
fundamental right seems to rest in Justice Kennedy’s hands for the moment.  Compare 
Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 956–57 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Ne-
braska law banning D&X does not constitute an undue burden on the therapeutic abor-
tion right), with Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1630–39 (2007)) (holding the same with re-
spect to the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003). 
312  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003) (relying on Casey to justify 
recognition of a broader autonomy right that protects intimate sexual conduct between 
homosexuals). 
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In his testimony before the Senate in 2004, Irving Weissman, a 
prominent embryonic stem cell researcher, warned legislators:  
“Whoever of you acts to ban this research is responsible for the lives it 
could save.”313  Since the suffering of so many hangs in the balance, a 
careful consideration of legal strategy is recommended, if not re-
quired, of prospective challengers to therapeutic research restric-
tions.  Indeed, only if they heed this advice will redress come to those 
presently being deprived of liberty without due process of law. 
 
313 MOONEY, supra note 3, at 201. 
